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Reinvigorating the Concept of Benefit:
The Failure of Drug Company-Sponsored
Research on Human Subjects
Jacqueline Fox ∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the early 1970s, Congress directed the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare to create a commission for the purpose of ascertaining the important principles that should guide biomedical research that uses human research subjects. The report of this commission was to be published by the Secretary in the Federal Register and,
unless the Secretary made any other proposals, it was to become law,
a statement of what the United States government required. This report became known as the Belmont Report, and its contents are
1
widely known, though its legal status is not as well-known or appreciated.
The world of research and science has changed dramatically
since the Belmont Report was written. This Article is not making a
new claim when it says that pharmaceutical companies manipulate
and suppress data that is generated on human research subjects in
order to protect and expand on the industry’s profitability. However,
the interplay between this use of data and the requirements of the
Belmont Report have, until now, gone unexamined.
Last year literally millions of Americans were participants in
medical research, with estimates ranging from 2.3 million to upwards
∗
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See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS (5th ed. 2001).

605

FOX_FINAL

606

4/11/2008 8:02:10 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:605

of 10 million persons enrolled as subjects in roughly 80,000 separate
2
studies. The pharmaceutical and medical device industry is the larg3
est consumer of human research subjects in the world because these
companies must prove a minimal level of safety and efficacy of their
products in order to receive governmental permission to market
them, and this regulatory approval requires conducting drug trials on
4
people. Pharmaceuticals and medical devices make up an industry
whose annual sales are measured in the hundreds of billions of dol5
lars. This large industry has recently been the subject of much criticism focused on the problem of undisclosed risks of harm for those
6
taking its products. The medical and professional commentary on
this issue has focused on the ethical implications of undisclosed risks
to the consumer and prescribing physician. A deeper problem lies
beneath this. We have, perhaps, a unique regulatory structure that
governs the use of human research subjects. The regulations in effect in the United States were written as a direct response to a moral
7
problem of exploitation of and harm to human subjects. The foundation of these regulations rests upon the Belmont Report, written in
2

See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES 29 (2004); see also
Adil E. Shamoo, Medical Research Subjects Must Be Better Protected, DAILY YOMIURI
ONLINE, June 1, 2006, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/columns/syndicate/2006061dy
0d.htm. The ten million subjects only includes those enrolled in drug trials; worldwide, Shamoo estimates that as many as fifty million persons are currently subjects
enrolled in research. Id. These numbers are almost impossible to calculate accurately, as there is no requirement that participation be reported to anyone and the
definitions of research can vary. For purposes of this Article, it is assumed that the
number in the United States falls somewhere between those two estimates, and that
the international number is also quite large.
3
See Richard A. Rettig, The Industrialization of Clinical Research, 19 HEALTH AFF.
129, 129–146 (2000).
4
Drug companies are dependent on early clinical information to ensure that
they progress rapidly. This dependency makes them exquisitely sensitive to legal and
regulatory actions that facilitate or constrain human experimentation. Barry Bloom,
The Role of Human Experimentation in Drug Research, in HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 42
(Robert L. Bogomolny ed., 1976) (describing in detail drug company dependency
on human subjects throughout the process of developing and marketing drugs, a
dependency that has not changed in the thirty years since this article was written).
5
PhRMA, the lobbying group for the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, calculated
that the 2005 worldwide sales by its members amounted to more than $250 billion.
See PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY PROFILE 49 (2006), http://www.pharma.org/files/2006 percent20Industry
percent20Profile.pdf [hereinafter PHARMA PROFILE].
6
The medical devices industry is subject to similar criticism. See, e.g., Richard A.
Friedman, What You Do Know Can’t Hurt You, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at A17.
7
See Quality of Health Care-Human Experimentation: Hearing on S. 974, S. 878, and
S.J. Res. 71 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d
Cong. 3–5 (1973) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits,
Ranking Minority Member, S. Comm. on Labor and Welfare).
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response to a congressional mandate to establish the ethical principles that must be complied with in order for research to be appropri8
ately conducted on human beings. Through a series of legislative
9
and regulatory actions, the ethical principles explained in the Belmont Report bear the weight of law. This foundation consists of
three ethical principles: (1) beneficence, (2) autonomy, and (3) justice, as well as the specific implications of these principles as ex10
plained in the Belmont Report. This Article is concerned with the
principle of beneficence, which, as described herein, maintains that it
is of primary and fundamental importance that people who volunteer
as subjects of dangerous research be assured of a reasonable likelihood of societal benefit resulting from that research.
Current controversies about data disclosure and suppression
reveal that this foundational principle is no longer garnering consis11
tent compliance. If the data generated through the use of human
research subjects is not properly utilized for the benefit of society, the
research is failing to satisfy this requirement of its legality. Moreover,
other forms of legal regulation pertaining to the pharmaceutical industry, which enable it to control financially valuable information,
diminish the likelihood of the information being made broadly avail12
able, further undermining the chance that a research project will
generate a societal benefit that can pass muster. This controversy is
fundamental and deep, and is not cashed out in a discussion of undisclosed risk of harm to the public.
Commentators have noted that suppression and manipulation of
data concerning prescription drugs presents a critical problem for
13
patients and for the overall goals of the scientific community, yet
the connection between this problem and the regulation of human
research subjects has not been adequately addressed. Professor Norman Dorsen, as the chair of a panel convened by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the 1970s to examine the FDA’s drug ap8

See Protection of Human Subjects: Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and
Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, Report of the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare Apr. 18, 1979) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 46) [hereinafter Belmont Report]; see also National Research Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 202, 88 Stat. 342, 353 (1974) (repealed 1990).
9
See National Research Act (setting forth Congress’s statement of intent).
10
Belmont Report, supra note 8.
11
See infra Part IV.
12
See infra Part III.
13
See Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health
and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837
(1980).
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proval process, recognized some ethical problems regarding data
suppression and the use of research subjects but did not see the full
14
range of legal implications. The negative impact of data suppression on the scientific community was also noted in the early 1980s
during a robust debate concerning whether drug safety and efficacy
information submitted by companies to the FDA as part of the drug
approval process should be subject to Freedom of Information Act
15
(FOIA) disclosure by the FDA. This Article contends that many of
the problems that have arisen since the 1970s regarding accurate information about drug safety and efficacy could have been averted by
a proper application of the requirement of benefit from the Belmont
Report, which would have, in turn, assuaged the ethical concerns expressed by Professor Dorsen and others.
Part II of this Article establishes the concept of benefit to society
as a foundational element within the context of the laws governing
16
research on human beings in the United States. In context, this
means that research, in order to be morally proper, must create a societal benefit. The merit of the normative value is not particularly
relevant for purposes of the thesis presented here. Rather, its importance lies within the fact that the normative value underlies and is
explicitly part of the regulatory structure governing human research
17
subjects in this country. This Part explains what the law requires,
analyzing the legal framework developed in the 1970s within which
the current regulations reside. Benefit to society emerges as far from
18
an empty requirement.
14

See REVIEW PANEL ON NEW DRUG REGULATION, DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., &
WELFARE, FINAL REPORT (1977) [hereinafter FINAL DORSEN REPORT]; REVIEW PANEL ON
NEW DRUG REGULATION, DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, INTERIM REPORT (1977)
[hereinafter INTERIM DORSEN REPORT].
15
See generally McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 13; see also Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). But see Toxic Substances Control Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2602(6)
(2000).
16
Belmont Report, supra note 8.
17
For example, during the process of IRB review, an IRB must decide that certain substantive regulatory requirements will be prospectively met based on the
study’s design. One such requirement is that the potential benefits of the trial be
substantial enough to balance the risk of actual harm to the subjects. The benefit
side of this equation is not a benefit that inures directly to the research subject. It
means the trial has to be reasonably calculated to contribute a benefit to society. No
direct benefit to the trial participants is usually possible or anticipated. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.111 (2007). Data suppression and manipulation are contrary to this requirement.
18
This analysis is done with the caveat that not all trials on human subjects conducted in this country must submit to regulation by the federal government, an outrage to many ethicists who write in this area. The reach of the regulations is limited
to trials where the results will be submitted to the FDA or where the study is funded
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Part III describes the regulatory and market culture that has
helped to prematurely bury the benefit requirement. The legal and
institutional culture under which research is conducted has undergone changes in the last forty years, which has resulted in a fracturing
of this foundational element, such that research often fails to properly satisfy it and that no additional safeguards in the approval process have been created to ensure its satisfaction. This Part describes
the shift from a culture where data dissemination was the norm to
one where its suppression and manipulation is common. There are
multiple reasons for this important change. During that time, the
federal government had been pursuing a policy of protecting market
incentives that, in theory, encouraged pharmaceutical companies to
19
innovate. For example, as alluded to above, these protections include the FDA giving trade secret protection to safety and efficacy
data filed with the FDA by those seeking FDA approval for their drugs
and devices, which in turn protects this data from disclosure in re20
sponse to FOIA requests. Further, many research results that once
belonged to the federal government by virtue its status as research
sponsor are now given to private companies who keep the results se21
cret in order to enhance their profitability. The policy goals behind
these schemes are internally coherent for the most part. In effect,
the goal is to take data derived from volunteer human research subjects and maximize the profitability that it offers to those who control
it. This Part shows how these policy goals conflict with the straightforward requirements of the human-research-subject regulations, in
that one must take the same valuable information and maximize the
broad societal benefit that can be derived from it in a way that the
current practices of the pharmaceutical industry cannot satisfy.
In the last three years, antidepressant use in a pediatric population was revealed to be far more dangerous than previously known,
in any part by the federal government. From a purely ethical perspective, this raises
substantial questions. If one asserts that the federal regulations are ethically required to be followed, having research conducted that is not compelled to submit to
these regulations is an ethically suspect endeavor. Discussion of this is outside the
scope of this Article, which, again, is not focused on explicating normative claims regarding the proper ethical requirements of research conducted on human beings.
Rather, the legal framework that exists is analyzed in the ethical context in which it
was developed.
19
See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 21 and 35 U.S.C.); see also Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2000).
20
5 U.S.C. § 552(a).
21
See 35 U.S.C. § 202.
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presenting a valuable case study of the full scope of this problem of
22
data suppression and manipulation. As a case study, Part IV examines the recent scandal concerning the pharmaceutical industry’s
23
suppression of both the raw data and subsequent analysis that
showed risks of suicidality and of limited or no efficacy for pediatric
populations using selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs).
The data was generated using human research subjects in at least fifteen drug trials that took place over the course of at least as many
24
years. All of these studies were subject to federal regulations, which
illustrates two important points: first, it shows the persistent failure of
pharmaceutical manufacturers to comply with the requirement of
conducting a study that creates a benefit for humankind; second, and
perhaps more importantly, it shows some of the myriad ways that this
possible benefit is not achieved—more specifically, it shows that the
potential societal value of the information is lessened through data
manipulation and suppression.
The conclusion and recommendations at the end of this Article
suggest the need to rethink what a commitment to the principle of
benefit to society means in the context of this Article’s criticisms of
the current research culture and to examine how the scientific community and pharmaceutical industry have degraded the benefit that is
derived.
At a certain point in medical progress, we use human beings as
research subjects because their bodies can generate data that we can25
not yet ascertain in any other way. In theory, we use these research
subjects to benefit society and many times there is no possibility of direct benefit for the subjects themselves. When we do this, we enter a
highly regulated area with an unusually ethically driven regulatory
structure. The implications for the drug industry have failed to be
properly examined with respect to the requirement that research
must strive to generate a benefit for humankind.

22

Alex Berenson, Medical Journal Criticizes Merck Over Vioxx Data, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
9, 2005, at A1. Paxil and other antidepressants are used as a case study in this Article
primarily because Congressional hearings, a lawsuit by the State of New York, and
other similar events have brought to light an unusual wealth of information about
what occurred with that class of pharmaceuticals. See infra Part IV.
23
For purposes of clarity, the use of the terms “data” and “datum” in this Article
refer to information that was collected or derived in some manner from the use of
human research subjects unless it is stated otherwise in the specific context.
24
These studies were all submitted to the FDA, bringing them within the scope of
the US regulations. See 5 U.S.C. § 2606(6) (2000).
25
CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH
HUMAN SUBJECTS 6 (2005).
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II. THE MEANING OF BENEFIT
This Part explains the role of benefit in analyzing the propriety
of any particular research proposal and further examines from where
this concept is derived and why it is legally relevant. We use human
beings as research subjects because we, as a society, need information
gleaned from their bodies to improve our lives. Research has often
been defined by contrasting it with the treatment of patients because
pure research, unlike medical care, is designed to test a hypothesis,
whereas medical care is performed to treat and heal individual pa26
tients. In research, the human subject is being used as a means by
27
society to achieve a more general benefit.
A. Background
Legal, historical, philosophical, and normative concerns arise
when we contemplate using humans as research subjects. To address
these concerns, we have developed a complex regulatory and ethical
28
structure. Our concern about human research subjects in the modern age is often traced back to World War II and the Nazis’ use of
concentration camp victims as involuntary subjects of medical re29
search. The Nuremberg Code, drafted in preparation for the war
crimes trials of the Nazi officers at those concentration camps, is at
30
the root of most subsequent regulatory work. The World Medical
Association adopted the Helsinki Accord in 1964, with subsequent
amendments, to provide basic guidelines for conducting biomedical
31
Both of these documents are relevant to this Article’s
research.
analysis, as they are precursors to the Belmont Report and are frequently cited in the supporting reports in its appendix.
The regulatory structure was developed to ascertain how the use
of humans could be condoned and conducted in an appropriate

26

See Robert J. Levine, The Boundaries Between Biomedical or Behavioral Research and
the Accepted and Routine Practice of Medicine, in THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH
app. 1, at 1-1 (1978) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT APPENDIX I].
27
The benefit that accrues to the subject as part of society is merely the same as
accrues to all other members, now and in the future.
28
COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 3–54 (discussing the history of this development).
29
See Rosamond Rhodes, Rethinking Research Ethics, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 7 (2005);
see also COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 16–31.
30
COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 25.
31
World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of Helsinki (June 1964) (last amended
2000), available at http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b3.htm [hereinafter Declaration of
Helsinki].
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32

manner. It is important when examining this structure to understand that it is considered inherently problematic to use people in
33
the way that research does. The overlapping and widely accepted
principles of respect for persons and the autonomy of individuals, for
example, discourage the idea of a human body used as a machine by
34
and for the benefit of others.
Once it is conceded that research on humans is problematic, the
ethical task becomes shaping the research in a manner that will resolve the problem or, if this is not possible, that will justify continuing
with research in its problematic position. In this context, how do we
respect a person, protect their autonomy, and somehow not use them
solely as a means to a greater societal gain, while at the same time
pursuing our research objectives? To keep this challenge in perspective, it is critical to recognize that research does not have to occur.
While we as a society stand to benefit greatly from this type of research, there is no clear moral obligation upon society to perform
35
it. As Hans Jonas said, “[o]ur descendants have a right to be left an
unplundered planet, [but] they do not have a right to a new miracle
cure. . . . [W]e have not sinned against them if by the time they come
around arthritis has not yet been conquered (unless by sheer ne36
glect).” Medical progress is an optional social goal. If no person
volunteers to be a research subject, we have no mechanism in place
to compel participation. In such a circumstance, if no volunteers
37
were forthcoming, research on volunteers would simply stop. Given
that the pursuit of research is not legally or morally required, it

32

COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 16–31.
Much of the literature on human research subjects tangles with this issue. See
Maurice Natanson, A Philosophical Perspective on the Assessment of Risk-Benefit Criteria in
Connection with Research Involving Human Subjects, in THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH
app. 2, at 21-17 (1978) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT APPENDIX II].
34
For further discussion, see David DeGrazia & Tom L. Beauchamp, Philosophy, in
METHODS IN MEDICAL ETHICS 31 (Jeremy Sugarman & Daniel P. Sulmasy eds., 2001).
35
See Natanson, supra note 33, at 21-17 (quoting Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, 98 DAEDALUS 228–29 (1969)).
36
See id.; see also NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, ETHICAL AND POLICY
ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS, at i (2001), http://www.bio
ethics.gov/reports/past_commissions/nbac_human_part.pdf [hereinafter BIOETHICS
COMMISSION] (quoting Jonas, supra note 35, and reaffirming that progress is an optional goal).
37
We do have mechanisms in place for conducting research on those who cannot give consent, such as infants and emergency department patients, and this presents a more problematic scenario regarding a blanket statement about compelled
participation. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (2006). While permissible under these specific conditions, there is no legal mandate that this research occur. See id.
33
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should then follow that if research cannot be conducted appropriately, it is not to be conducted at all. To be explicit, the appropriate
default position is that no research occurs if it cannot occur properly.
This default position is important because this Article asserts that
much of current research sponsored by drug companies is not being
properly conducted and so should no longer be conducted unless
these problems are fixed.
The ethical framework for using human research subjects has a
peculiarly powerful legal relevance in the United States due to the
38
Belmont Report.
The Belmont Report holds a unique place in
American legal history. The Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW), now known as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), adopted the very short, philosophical paper to
39
form a foundation for its policies for research on human subjects.
The Belmont Report explains the “ethical principles and guidelines
40
for research involving human subjects.” This philosophical paper
was published in the Federal Register, was commented upon, and
41
then became a binding regulation of the federal government. It is
42
still in effect.
By adopting this paper as a statement of policy, HHS made its
ethical, normative analysis of the use of human research subjects part
of the law. The regulations that were adopted to govern the use of
human subjects shortly after completion of the Belmont Report were
primarily drafted by those responsible for writing the Belmont Re43
port, making the connection between them even clearer.
38

Belmont Report, supra note 8.
See National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974) (repealed
1990).
40
Belmont Report, supra note 8.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
The recommendations of the Commission are “embodied in a living way in the
regulations” that govern human subject research. Interview by The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical & Behavioral Research
with F. William Dommel, Jr., J.D., NIH Liaison to the National Commission, NIH, in
Bethesda, Md. (Sept. 16, 2004) (Dommel was a staff person for the Commission and
assisted in drafting the regulations); see also Interview by Bernard A. Schwetz, D.V.M.,
Ph.D., Director, Office for Human Research Protections, HHS, with LeRoy B. Walters, Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr. Professor of Christian Ethics, Georgetown University, in
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 24, 2004) available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/Belmont
ReportArchive.html#histArchive2 [hereinafter Walters Interview] (explaining that
the Secretary had 180 days to either adopt or respond to the recommendations of
the Commission.); Interview by Bernard A. Schwetz, D.V.M., Ph.D., Director, Office
of Human Research Protections, HHS, with Tom Lamar Beauchamp, Ph.D., Senior
Research Scholar, Kennedy Institute of Ethics in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/BelmontReportArchive.html#histArchive2
39
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In the early 1970s, a series of news stories appeared about biomedical research and medical treatment that provoked the Senate to
hold hearings about how research on human subjects was being con44
ducted. The Tuskegee syphilis study had recently been exposed,
along with reports of involuntary sterilization of African-American
45
women and unapproved experimentation on newly aborted fetuses.
These hearings, in turn, led to the passage of the National Research
46
Act, which created the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (the “Com47
mission”).
The Commission was given specific charges in its enabling act. It
had recommendations and reports on certain topics which it was to
48
prepare and then file with the Secretary of HEW. The Secretary
then had 180 days to act on each recommendation either by formulating regulations to implement it or by explaining why the proposal
49
was not an appropriate action. An observer of current presidential
bioethics councils will be struck by how the design of the Commission
50
differs from those we have seen since. By giving it clear topics, assignments, and dates by which it was to complete its work, and by ordering the Secretary to respond within six months to its recommen-

[hereinafter Beauchamp Interview] (“Interviewer: ‘The [Belmont Report] is pretty
clearly the basis for the regulations[?]’ Beauchamp: ‘Yeah.’”); Interview by The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research with Bonnie M. Lee, B.A., Associate Director for Human Subject Protection Policy, FDA, in Rockville, Md. (Aug. 13, 2004) (explaining that the 1981 HHS
and FDA IRB regulations were based on the Commission’s recommendations and
that the 1991 Common Rule is very similar); Interview by Patricia C. El-Hinnawy, Office for Human Research Protections, HHS, with Norman Fost, M.D., Professor of
Pediatrics, University of Wisconsin Medical School, in Madison, Wis. (May 13, 2004),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/BelmontReportArchive.html#histArchive2
[hereinafter Fost Interview] (The “Commission [was] unlike any other in the history
of this country . . . in that it had this statutory authority to write rules, which would
become law . . . unless changed by the Secretary of [HHS.]”).
44
COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 39–45.
45
Senate Hearings, supra note 7.
46
See National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974) (repealed
1990).
47
See id.
48
See id.
49
Id. According to language in the Act, the recommendation from the Commission would then become law if the Secretary failed to act within the proper time
frame. Id.
50
For a discussion of these commissions, see The President's Council on Bioethics
and Approaches to Public Deliberation Taken by National Bioethics Commissions, 15 KENNEDY
INST. ETHICS J. 221–322 (2005).

FOX_FINAL

2008]

4/11/2008 8:02:10 AM

REINVIGORATING THE CONCEPT OF BENEFIT

615

dations or the recommendation would be binding, the Commission
was designed to effectively make and implement policy in this area.
The Belmont Report was written by the Commission in response
to its charge to “identify the basic ethical principles that should underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral research involving
human subjects and to develop guidelines which should be followed
to assure that such research is conducted in accordance with these
51
principles.”
Due to the legislative background of the Commission’s work, the
normative values that are described in the Belmont Report and other
writings by it have an important role in analyzing whether any one
particular type of research on human subjects is legal. This role is
fundamentally different from other normative studies related to the
development of laws, because the work of the Commission is not
merely useful as evidence of intent of the type found in legislative history. Rather, in the case of the Belmont Report, it is part of the ac52
tual regulatory framework that governs this type of research.
As we examine what the guiding principles are for research on
humans, it will become clear that certain ethical requirements must
be met in each separate incident of research. One such requirement
is that the study must be designed to generate certain benefits to so53
ciety —benefits that must, under the rules, be anticipated in the de54
sign of the study and accrue from that study alone. However, these
benefits are primarily measured by assessing the possible advancement of scientific knowledge derived from analyzing any data generated by the study, not contributions to some larger economic or so55
cial scheme.
To reiterate, research on human subjects is an inherently selfish
undertaking by society. Society hopes to benefit from the use of a
human’s body in circumstances where the human does not stand to
56
benefit directly on his or her own from this same use. The most basic requirement of research, as demanded by the Belmont Report, is
51

Levine, supra note 26.
Belmont Report, supra note 8.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
The subject is not, individually, conceived as a beneficiary by the researcher.
There is a problem with informed consent called the therapeutic misconception,
whereby a subject believes he or she is likely to benefit from participation in a study,
even when this is impossible or unlikely. When this arises, it is a problem with informed consent and is not part of the benefit analysis. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 9.
52
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that we must not undertake this research unless the possible benefit
57
to society is substantial enough to justify this use of humans. This
requirement alone is certainly not enough to satisfy all ethical requirements for proper use of human research subjects; it is a neces58
sary but not sufficient condition.
Two separate claims are made here about the regulatory structure governing research on human subjects. The first is that a potential benefit to society, or to phrase it differently, to humankind, is a
fundamental requirement of the design of all research conducted on
human beings subject to federal regulations. It is the first quality of a
proposed research project that must be assessed, and if it is absent
59
the research project cannot go forward.
The second claim is that the benefit, for purposes of this type of
analysis, must be assessed as to the probability of it being generated
60
within the boundaries of the individual proposed research project.
It cannot be enhanced through the addition of possible externalities
that could benefit humanity, such as the profitability of drug companies.
B. Foundational Status of the Concept of Benefit
1.

Early Foundations and the Belmont Report

This Article claims foundational status for the requirement that
a study on human subjects must be designed to benefit society. This
61
requirement is embodied in United States law, and is also explicitly
62
63
present in the Nuremburg Code and the Helsinki Accord. This
goal of research appears to be assumed as a primary motivator for re64
search by participants writing in this field. Due to changes in the
culture in which research is now conducted, those who sponsor and
65
conduct studies have changed their motivation. Because of this cultural change, it is necessary to carefully examine the immutable responsibilities that this foundational requirement of benefit actually

57

Belmont Report, supra note 8.
Id.
59
Id. The other requirements are autonomy and justice. Id.
60
Id.
61
See 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2006).
62
See 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 181–83 (1949) [hereinafter NUREMBERG].
63
Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 31.
64
See infra notes 74–80 and accompanying text.
65
See infra Part III.
58
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imposes on those who would conduct research on humans, as this requirement can no longer simply be assumed to be satisfied.
Paragraph two of the Nuremberg Code states that an “experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society,
unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random
66
or unnecessary in nature.” The primary legal and scholarly focus
since World War II has been on ensuring the voluntary, informed
consent of research subjects. The Nazis used concentration camp
prisoners as objects of their experiments. Many of the research scandals in the United States involved subjects who were not given adequate opportunity to decide for themselves if they wished to be a part
67
of a specific research project. In light of these events, issues concerning consent and exploitation of subjects have dominated the discussion, for example, as to whether consent is truly voluntarily given
(such as with prisoners or hospitalized patients) and how to ensure
sufficient information has been disclosed concerning risks to make a
68
subsequent consent truly informed.
The concept of benefit derived from research has had a poor
history in terms of scholarly focus—it is depended upon, but a bit
taken for granted. Scientific research has historically been conducted for the dual purposes of acquiring respect from one’s peers
69
and the betterment of humankind. Publication of research in peerreviewed journals accomplished both of these goals, which gave the
more prestigious journals tremendous power in the scientific com70
The history of biomedical research is filled with people
munity.
who took risks on themselves, their children, and innumerable vul71
nerable subjects to prove a hypothesis that would later save lives. It
is also filled with those whose hypotheses failed, even after also put72
ting subjects at a high level of risk.
The early framework for biomedical research in this country,
dating back to the foundation of Johns Hopkins Medical School and
66

NUREMBERG, supra note 62.
See, e.g., M. P. KING, The Dangers of Difference, 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 35
(1992).
68
See generally RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT (1986).
69
See infra Part IV; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 182 n.17 (1987).
70
See Frank Davidoff et al., Sponsorship, Authorship and Accountability, 135 ANNALS
OF INTERNAL MED. 463, 463–66 (2001).
71
M.H. PAPPWORTH, HUMAN GUINEA PIGS: EXPERIMENTATION ON MAN 31–174
(1967).
72
Id.
67
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the Rockefeller University in the early 1900s, was of researchers work73
ing without any expectation of profiting financially from their work.
It is difficult in the current environment to imagine this, but many
researchers and academic research centers expressly eschewed financial motivations, worried that it could corrupt the research enter74
prise. This continued into the 1970s. Dr. Albert Jonsen, a member
of the Commission, stated in an interview conducted in 2004 that “at
the time the Commission was working, researchers rarely even
thought of profiting from anything they might produce. That’s what
75
they did, and it became a public good.”
Biomedical researchers were focused on variable degrees of so76
cial good, public benefit, and their own acclaim upon publication.
The concern was that the researchers were liable to not sufficiently
respect the individual persons upon whom their experiments were
77
being conducted. This logically led to the scholarly focus on the
voluntary nature of the subject’s undertaking and the question of informed consent. With researchers fueled by a sense of pursuing a
greater social good, the risk was of exploitation and damage to an individual’s autonomy. In the early years of successful biomedical research in the United States, the language of the more prominent figures was of fighting a battle on disease, and their losses of research
78
subjects have been justified as necessary losses. A crude utilitarian
argument held sway, fueled by a paternalistic relationship between
doctors and patients that already failed to give adequate voice to a pa79
tient’s autonomy.
In light of this culture there are two sets of concerns reflected in
the Belmont Report, and which still hold sway in the field. The first
is with the prevention of gross crimes such as those that occurred
73

See JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE EPIC STORY OF THE DEADLIEST
PLAGUE IN HISTORY 11–87 (2004), for a history of the culture of research at these institutions in the early 1900s.
74
Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 181 nn.8–9 .
75
Interview by The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research with Albert R. Jonsen, Ph.D., Professor of
Medical Ethics, University of California at San Francisco Medical School, in San
Francisco, Cal. (May 14, 2004).
76
Sheldon Krimsky, Publication Bias, Data Ownership, and the Funding Effect in Science: Threats to the Integrity of Biomedical Research, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS:
REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 61 (Wendy Wagner & Rena
Steinzor eds., 2006).
77
See infra notes 170–77 and accompanying text.
78
See generally JAY KATZ, EXERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS (1972).
79
BARRY, supra note 73; COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 14–16; see generally JAY
KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (2002).

FOX_FINAL

2008]

4/11/2008 8:02:10 AM

REINVIGORATING THE CONCEPT OF BENEFIT

619

with the Nazis and, on a smaller scale, in the Tuskegee syphilis stud80
ies. The second is with how to impose a balance upon the profession, with the desire to achieve a benefit on one hand and the rights
81
of the research subjects on the other.
The Belmont Report is divided into three parts. Part A defines
82
the boundaries between practice and research. This section serves
the purpose of showing that when research occurs, it must be subject
83
to review by an institutional review board (IRB). The goal is to define research broadly in order that the protections provided by an
IRB review will be broadly available to those subjects who will need
84
it. Part B delineates the basic ethical principles that are relevant to
85
the ethics of research involving human subjects. These principles
86
are respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. Part C describes
where it is anticipated these general principles delineated in Part B
87
will be applied.
88
Principle One, respect for persons, is similar to Paragraph One
of the Nuremberg Code, which states that the voluntary consent of
89
the human subject is absolutely essential. Respect for persons is a
principle that engages ideas of autonomy, and, for those who cannot
exercise autonomy, a requirement that they be adequately pro90
tected.
Principle Three, justice, may be implicated in the problem identified here, though the requirements of justice as delineated in the
Belmont Report do not make as clear-cut a case for requiring disclo91
sure of research data.
“Who ought to receive the benefits of re92
search and bear its burdens?” This is a question that brings issues of
80

Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,192.
Id. at 23,192–93.
82
Id. at 23,193.
83
Id.
84
Levine, supra note 26.
85
Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,193–94.
86
Id. The primary author of the Belmont Report, Thomas Beauchamp, working
with Jim Childress, a philosopher who had also been involved in the project of preparing the Belmont Report, wrote The Principles of Biomedical Ethics soon after publication of the Report, explaining these principles in greater detail. BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra note 1.
87
Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,193–94.
88
Belmont Report, supra note 8.
89
NUREMBERG, supra note 62.
90
Belmont Report, supra note 8.
91
Interestingly, a claim could be made that justice arguments support a pharmaceutical industry that generates a net societal gain.
92
See Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,194.
81
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societal benefits to the forefront, in the context of who the proper
subjects of research are. For example, if the poor are subjects of research, yet only the wealthy receive subsequent medical care as a result of that research, have we created an affront to notions of justice?
Arguably, it is entirely exploitative to have a class of research subjects
who do not stand to be recipients of the benefit that may be derived
from the results of the trial, even as members in the broader societal
group.
Principle Two, beneficence, is the relevant portion of Part B of
the Belmont Report for purposes of this Article’s analysis. The concept of beneficence is complicated in the Belmont Report; there is an
93
economy used in stating principles in this Report and each one is
expected to move the project of the Commission quite far.
The principle of beneficence is used to describe both the mandate to do no harm and the mandate to maximize benefits and
94
minimize possible harms from the research project as a whole. The
concept “do no harm” comes from the Hippocratic Oath, as stated
95
directly in the Belmont Report. This concept is included at the be96
ginning of the discussion, rather than an end point. The challenge
for the drafters of the Belmont Report, and the challenge generally
in this area, is how to ethically justify an undertaking that exposes an
individual to a risk of harm with no expectation of an immediate,
physical, or direct benefit to the subject. The Belmont Report asserts
that learning both what will benefit patients and what will cause them
risk is an integral part of the process of protecting each individual patient, and thus makes the biomedical research agenda acceptable
notwithstanding the requirement that the treating physician “do no
97
harm.” In effect, by learning how to treat patients more effectively
98
in general, one is acting within the requirement to do no harm.
The Belmont Report asserts that since learning these facts may
require exposing subjects to risk, the next challenge under beneficence is to assess “when it is justified to seek certain benefits despite
93

See id. at 23,193–94; see also generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1.
Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,194.
95
Id. Interestingly, the use of the Hippocratic Oath reflects the role of physicians
in defining the ethics of research on humans, though scientists without medical degrees conduct much of modern research.
96
Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,194.
97
Id.
98
This argument seems to stem from a desire to pursue research on human subjects even while recognizing that it is ethically problematic for physicians to do so in
light of the Hippocratic Oath, with its stated duty to the well-being of the individual
patient.
94
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99

the risks involved.” Beneficence is the concept that normatively justifies the research endeavor—the same motivation for the betterment
of humankind that historically led physicians and scientists to con100
duct biomedical research on human beings. It introduces the concept of benefit and the challenge of finding an appropriate balance
between the benefit and acceptable levels of risk to the subject.
2.

Explication of the Principles of the Belmont Report

In preparing the Belmont Report, the Commission requested
specific people to prepare a number of reports on issues relevant to
identifying and defining the principles to be respected in conducting
101
research—these reports were published in a two-volume appendix.
In searching for the meaning of benefit as used both in the Belmont
Report and in the literature on this issue generally, it is helpful to see
how that concept is treated by the authors of the different reports in
the appendix.
Dr. Robert Levine prepared a series of reports for this project of
102
His first report, and the first in the appendix,
the Commission.
seeks to delineate the boundaries between research on human sub103
jects and medical practice on patients.
This report was prepared
primarily because, in distinguishing between these two kinds of subjects, a definition of research had been developed. Levine states that
“[w]hile the health care professional might be assumed to see the
well-being of the patient as the most important end, the investigator
is assumed to see development of new knowledge as a major, if not
104
ultimate, end.” What we see here is the role played by this assumption of the investigator’s motive, the development of new knowledge.
In Dr. Levine’s second report, concerning the role of risk-benefit
criteria, he analyzes in some detail what an IRB should properly consider when analyzing risk and benefit for purposes of approval of a

99

Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,194.
See PAPPWORTH, supra note 71, at 8–12 (criticizing human experimentation that
forgets beneficence and looks only to the value of knowledge).
101
See BELMONT REPORT APPENDIX I, supra note 26; BELMONT REPORT APPENDIX II,
supra note 33.
102
See BELMONT REPORT APPENDIX I, supra note 26, at 1-1 to 4-103.
103
See generally Levine, supra note 26.
104
Id. at 1-4. The Common Rule is the popular name for the assortment of rules
governing research on human subjects that have been agreed upon by the majority
of federal agencies.
100
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105

research proposal. The two concepts of risk and benefit are closely
related and do not necessarily occupy entirely separate columns. For
example, if the goal of research is to benefit society, one possible risk
106
of not doing research is a loss of this societal benefit.
107
One important requirement of the Belmont Report and the
108
Common Rule is that research be designed to enhance the probability of something relevant being discovered. This requirement is
tied to the concept of benefit in this report, where Dr. Levine states:
There is no way to separate the issue of quality of scientific design
of research from the ethical considerations as to whether it
should be done. If research is badly designed, it is not likely to
benefit anyone[.] [I]t seems inappropriate to put human beings
at risk to develop information (or misinformation) that cannot
109
conceivably benefit either the individual or society.

Dr. Levine also references the Nuremburg Code as giving support to this concept; it states “[t]he experiment should be such as to
yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other
methods or means of study, and not random or unnecessary in na110
ture.”
Dr. Levine cements his adoption of this concept from the
Nuremberg Code by then stating that “[i]t is inappropriate to put
humans at risk to gain information that can be secured without put111
ting humans at risk.”
This principle is important here because it tells us how a research proposal is to be measured: first, by what it hopes to accomplish for society, and, second, how well it is designed to accomplish
112
that task. Some minimum must be met in the quality of design for
accomplishing this task (the good of society) for the research to be
an ethical and appropriate undertaking.
Dr. Levine contemplates benefits to society and benefits to the
individuals who are the research subjects (as does the Belmont Re113
port).
In analyzing benefits to society, Dr. Levine divides research

105

See Robert J. Levine, The Role of Assessment of Risk Benefit Criteria in the Determination of the Appropriateness of Research Involving Human Subjects, in BELMONT REPORT
APPENDIX I, supra note 26, at 2-3.
106
Id.
107
See Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,194.
108
45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2006).
109
Levine, supra note 104, at 2-30.
110
Id. at 2-32 (citing NUREMBERG, supra note 62).
111
Id. at 2-32.
112
Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,195–96.
113
See Levine, supra note 105, at 2-32 to 2-33; see also Belmont Report, supra note 8.
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into four categories, only the first of which is relevant here.
This
category of research is applied biomedical and behavioral research,
which he defines as research for developing and perfecting diagnos115
tic, prophylactic, and therapeutic modalities.
For this type of research, Dr. Levine makes it clear that the benefits to society that should be relevant in the IRB analysis are those that
116
are potentially generated by that specific project. This supports the
assertion made earlier in this Article that one cannot satisfy the requirement of a benefit by claiming a net societal good from our
117
As Dr. Levine
pharmaceutical industry as currently constructed.
explains, it is far easier to demonstrate the benefit of research in
118
general than of any particular proposed research project.
For example, the benefits to society of antibiotics, or of a particular antibiotic, are quite large. This does not result in any study of antibiotics
presumptively satisfying the requirement that it be likely to produce a
benefit merely because the focus is on this generally beneficial substance. At the same time, “some well-conceived research projects
have yielded no valuable drugs”; nevertheless, pursuing them was not
119
“When speaking of a particular research proposal one
unethical.
120
can only discuss potential or hoped for benefit.” This is a complex
undertaking that requires an examination of the details of the study
being proposed, divorced from the generalized notion of societal
121
Dr. Levine also
benefit of the pharmaceutical industry generally.
includes possible negative findings, those that show a failure of efficacy, as potentially counting towards the assessment of the benefit of
122
It seems accurate to interpret this language as
a proposed study.
asserting that a reference to a broad, historical, achieved benefit is
not appropriate in a risk-benefit analysis performed by an IRB.
Dr. Levine’s report gives detailed consideration to what an IRB is
meant to consider when assessing benefit in the risk-benefit analy-

114

The other three are basic research using human subjects, basic research not
using human subjects, and social research. Levine, Assessment, supra note 105.
115
Id., at 2-32. Dr. Levine considers how economic benefit can be considered and
uses it in a benefit equation as those economic benefits that come from a reduction
of cost in the treatment of the specific illness whose treatment is being tested. Id.
116
Id. at 2-32 to 2-33.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Levine, supra note 105, at 2-33.
121
Id. at 2-36 to 2-44.
122
Id. “[R]esearch that proves with certainty that a specific . . . maneuver is not
valuable . . . safe . . . [or] effective [] also benefits society.” Id. at 2-33.
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123

sis. The IRB must identify the benefit that is hoped for at that spe124
This “hoped-for” benefit
cific time, from that specific project.
needs to be described to an IRB in the context of the expected bene125
fit to the subject and to society.
It is meant to be described with
some detailed analysis of probability and magnitude, and the analysis
126
should consider expected duration of all aspects of the benefit.
Duration of a benefit is often connected to the plans of the study
sponsor and can have an important impact on the calculus of both
127
An example of a duration issue
individual and societal benefits.
given in the report is where a drug is proven to have a beneficial modality in a small number of subjects, yet the sponsor decides to dis128
In this hypothetical, the sponsor’s decision
continue producing it.
is driven by the fact that the study has failed to show the drug is beneficial to a sufficient number of individuals to make its further devel129
opment worth the sponsor’s continued investment.
Dr. Levine’s report appears to call for a complex and nuanced
assessment of the benefit of a particular study. The report also explicitly states that the possible benefit from that study is potentially
reduced based on what the study sponsor may do in the future with
130
the fruits of the study. This analysis has critical implications for the
effect of current behaviors of the drug industry on IRB considerations.
In another report prepared for the Commission in anticipation
of the Belmont Report, H. Tristram Engelhardt outlines what he believes are the basic ethical principles that are implicated concerning
131
132
human experimentation. He arrives at three principles. The first
133
is respect for persons as free moral agents. The second is a concern
134
The
to support the best interests of human subjects in research.
123

Id. at 2-44 to 2-54.
Id.
125
Id.
126
Levine, supra note 105, at 2-50.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 2-51.
129
Id.
130
See id.
131
See H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Basic Ethical Principles in the Conduct of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research Involving Human Subjects, in BELMONT REPORT APPENDIX I, supra
note 26, at 8-1 to 8-2.
132
Id. at 8-8.
133
Id. This is not surprising. The backdrop of historical events where this particular principle was violated has consistently made this the most prominent issue discussed in this area.
134
Id.
124
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third, and most relevant here, is an interest in assuring that the use of
human subjects in experimentation will, in sum, redound to the
135
benefit of society. He expands on this third moral principle by stating that one should have concern to maximize the benefits accruable
136
to society from research involving human subjects.
The conflict Engelhardt perceives with these three principles is
to some degree insoluble. We are putting individuals at risk for society’s general benefit, and so we are using them. How do we justify
this? Importantly, we make sure their choices are voluntary and in137
formed, as protected by his first principle.
Equally important, as
reflected in his three principles, is to make sure their sacrifice is not
for a frivolous purpose. The identified beneficiary is society, and part
of the job in policing research is to ensure that society’s interest is not
squandered.
Philosopher Maurice Natanson’s paper for the Commission, A
Philosophical Perspective on the Assessment of Risk-Benefit Criteria in Connec138
tion with Research Involving Human Subjects, like Engelhardt’s report,
shows who the contemplated beneficiaries are in this risk-benefit calculation. “Ultimately, society itself is said to benefit from the advance
of medical knowledge . . . [one cannot] reduce the meaning of bene139
The issue in Natanson’s paper is balfit to patient-benefit alone.”
140
In assessancing the needs of society and the rights of individuals.
ing what individuals are being asked to undergo, he recognizes that
even minimal or acceptable risk may mean severe suffering or death
141
to some. He then worries, as “it is not easy to reconcile medical intervention done with a bare minimum of ethicality with serving the
good of society. It would seem that such intervention has only a limited connection with the welfare of the patient-subject but a powerful
142
relationship to the abstract development of medical knowledge.”
135

Id.
Id. at 8-5.
137
Natanson, supra note 33, at 8-9.
138
Id. at 21-1.
139
Id. at 21-12.
140
Id. at 21-15.
141
Id. at 21-12. There was a recent reminder of the meaning of an acceptable degree of risk in the Phase 1 trial conducted in England in the spring of 2006, where
six healthy young men were given a drug known as TGN1412 and quickly went into
multiple organ failure. Ganesh Suntharalingam et al., Cytokine Storm in a Phase 1 Trial
of the Anti-CD28 Monoclonal Antibody TGN1412, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1018, 1018–19
(2006). At the time this Article was printed, their prognosis was unknown, though it
appeared grim; signs of rapidly developing cancers were detected in two of the trial
subjects since the study took place. Id. at 1022.
142
Natanson, supra note 33, at 21-18.
136
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Clearly, from his perspective, there are two actors in this analysis—
society in general and the individual research subject.
In an essay prepared by Dr. Lawrence Raisz, we also see this pre143
sumed limitation on the beneficiaries to be considered.
As he discusses the proper components of informed consent, he details what
information should be made clear to a possible research subject who
is not going to experience any physical benefit from participation in
144
“It does seem appropriate to tell the volunteers in a
the study.
study what the expected benefits to the other members of society
might be . . . [, as] any volunteer should have the privilege of know145
ing why they are being asked to take a risk.” Note that this implies,
in the inverse, that the only possible reason for being asked to take a
risk, such as one contemplated here, is a potential benefit to society,
and it is the delineation of this benefit that proper informed consent
requires. The choice presumably faced by the individual is whether
or not the potential benefit is enough, in his or her own mind, for
him or her to undergo the risk.
3.

Interviews with Contributors to the Belmont Report

In 2004, the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP)
conducted a series of interviews with the participants in the original
146
Commission of the 1970s.
In the interviews, some of the participants alluded to the concept of benefit, or beneficence, and to soci147
ety as the proper beneficiary. The interview with Tom Beauchamp,
who worked for the Commission as a staff philosopher and was the
148
principal author of the Belmont Report, is an example.
He stated
that, in his opinion, the biggest failure in the IRB system is that people do not adequately understand the implications of the rules and
guidelines. “Being a research subject is a burden . . . . The whole
point of research is to protect people against injury and disease and
149
the like . . . so it becomes a balancing consideration.”
To refer to
the whole point of research as protecting people, as he does here, is

143

Lawrence C. Raisz, Essay on Some Problems of Risk-Benefit Analysis in Clinical Pharmacology, in BELMONT REPORT APPENDIX II, supra note 33, at 22-1.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
HHS Office for Human Research Protections, Oral History Archive, http://
www.hhs.gov/ohrp/Belmont ReportArchive.html#histArchive2 (last visited Jan. 25,
2008).
147
See Beauchamp Interview, supra note 43.
148
Id.
149
Id.
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to make it clear that the only acceptable end point of research is that
protection.
150
Michael Yesley’s interview brought up two relevant issues. The
first was his concern that human subject protections have become
both over- and under-regulated, as the regulations have tended to focus on the “minutiae of regulatory compliance” and missed the broad
151
goal they were meant to achieve.
One of his primary concerns was
152
This
with the international research currently being conducted.
concern has bearing on the concept of society as the beneficiary of
153
research and relates to outsourcing the risk of research. Along with
other challenges to international research, such concerns often focus
on the community where the research is occurring, and how, in many
cases, that population is not likely to ever benefit from the medicines
154
or devices that are being tested. This is particularly true of a population that does not suffer from a problem or one that has a limited
or no medical infrastructure with which to provide any required care
of the type being tested.
The concern among those studying the ethics of international
research from this perspective is that there may be a requirement
under the justice principle of the Belmont Report and other bioethical structures that use a principle-based analysis that “society” be
read to include the more immediate community where research is
155
being conducted as a likely beneficiary.
It is potentially too exploitative to have the human subjects on one side undertaking the
inherent risks, and then to have a community far removed from them
156
as the probable recipient of the hoped-for benefit. This adds a nuance to the concept of “benefit to society” discussed here. In effect,
the society that stands as the beneficiary should be drawn narrowly
enough to satisfy the requirements of justice as described in the Belmont Report and as embodied in the Common Rule. Analyzing this
from a justice perspective reinforces what a benefit is in this context:
something concrete a society can hope to actually have.
150

Interview by Patricia C. El-Hinnawy, Office for Human Research Protections,
HHS, with Michael Yesley, J.D., Manager, Ethic, Legal and Social Implications, Human Genome Project, in Santa Fe, N.M. (Aug. 19, 2004), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/Belmont ReportArchive.html#histArchive2 [hereinafter
Yesley Interview].
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Yesley Interview, supra note 150.
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Norman Fost, interviewed in May 2004, spoke of science and the
advancement of knowledge, using the concepts apparently interchangeably in discussing the conflict between the subject and the
157
goal of research. When you are doing research,
[y]ou’re not doing it for the interest of the subject, you’re asking
him or her to sacrifice their interests in the name of science. . . .
[I]n the research setting, the interest of the subject is never the
primary interest. The primary interest is always to advance
knowledge. And the question is how to do that in a way that’s
158
ethically acceptable.

Albert Jonsen felt that beneficence is defined “quite narrowly” in
159
the Belmont Report.
“We talk about ‘beneficence’ in a relatively
general way as bringing some benefit to the subject . . . and [a] benefit to society, but then we immediately make the practical application
160
In his opinion, beneficence as used in
of risk-benefit assessment.”
the Belmont Report could be “susceptible of broader interpreta161
tion.”
Jonsen felt that in this current decade conflicts of interest are
emerging as a critical problem related to beneficence:
[N]ow the question, I think, has to do with researcher’s affiliation
with commercial enterprises and with the opportunity of the clinician to get patents—or the researcher to get patents to profit by
the work that he or she is doing. And at the time the Commission
was working, researchers rarely even thought of profiting from
anything that they might produce. That’s what they did, and it
162
became a public good.

He then went on to say this problem is “a matter of beneficence, because one of the problems in conflict of interest is what benefit is mo163
tivating this work, and who gets that benefit.”
Robert Cooke, another interviewee, when asked which principle
was most important, said:

157

Fost Interview, supra note 43.
Id.
159
Interview by Bernard A. Schwetz, D.V.M., Ph.D., Director, Office for Human
Research Protections, HHS, with Albert R. Jonsen, Ph.D., Professor of Medical Ethics, Univ. of Cal. at San Francisco Med. School, in San Francisco, Cal. (May 14, 2004),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/BelmontReportArchive.html#histArchive2
[hereinafter Jonsen Interview].
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
See id.; see also Walters Interview, supra note 43.
163
Jonsen Interview, supra note 159. He also believes conflicts of interest implicate the other two principles, as well. Id.
158
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Well, as a researcher, you’d like to think that beneficence would
be the most important; because why do you do research unless
you’re trying to help somebody out? But from my standpoint the
greatest protection comes from respect for persons. It really
means that you value someone as a human being, and not just as a
164
subject of research.

From this and other quotes, it becomes clear that benefit to society was already an important part of research ethics before the Belmont Report. The Belmont Report made benefit to society explicitly
part of the regulatory policy for the United States government. It did
this in the context of adding a requirement for a rigorous assessment
165
of benefit in a risk-benefit analysis.
The discussion of respect for
persons really added something new, especially as it was viewed as almost in competition with the desire for a benefit for society. One has
to balance the two to achieve ethically conducted research, but both
must be there in adequate quantities and qualities. Each is necessary
but neither, alone, is sufficient. Cooke also expressed his own worry
about beneficence in the modern era, stating “[t]he individual investigator, without any kind of review would be a disaster[;] they may
have great financial benefit and at times, maybe benefit to humanity
166
isn’t the primary consideration.”
III. THE CHANGING CULTURE OF
MEDICAL RESEARCH—THE DECLINE OF BENEFICENCE
As shown in Part II, when the Belmont Report was written, beneficence was assumed to be a primary motivator of researchers and
its presence is now a necessary regulatory component of an acceptable research proposal. As this Part will demonstrate, a number of
legal and financial changes to the environment in which research occurs have altered the motivations and conduct of researchers, such
that the financial goals of drug companies are now the primary value
being served in much of the research being conducted, and the relevant requirement of beneficence, to generate a benefit for humankind, is at risk. As discussed in Part II, the regulations now in place
governing research on human beings actually have the power to
make sufficient demands on research to rectify this problem in all

164

Interview by Bernard A. Schwetz, D.V.M., Ph.D., Director, Office for Human
Research Protections, HHS, with Robert E. Cooke, Chairman, Department of Pediatrics, Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, in Baltimore, Md. (May 15, 2004) available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/Belmont ReportArchive.html#histArchive2.
165
Id.
166
Id.
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studies that are required to comply with the federal regulations
drafted in connection with the Belmont Report. However, the ramifications of the cultural shift described here have not been properly
recognized or responded to by the research community in the context of this regulatory power. Commentators as varied as Norman
Dorsen and LeRoy Walters have noted the ethical ramifications of a
failure to satisfy the beneficence requirement, yet never made the fi167
nal, necessary connection to the regulations that can affect change.
We have moved from a world where the search for answers was
an assumed primary motivator of research to one where a prudent
person understands that the suppression and manipulation of data
that occurred with SSRI safety and efficacy data can easily happen
with other drugs or medical devices. If this broad cultural shift had
not occurred, one could argue that cases such as those described in
Part IV, below, were occasional problems of a type that is not new or
particularly remarkable and which require no broad reassessment of
168
Given the cultural shift described
how studies should be assessed.
here, however, it is clear we can no longer focus primarily on acceptable risks and informed consent. The benefit requirement for acceptable studies appears to be failing. In response to this, a concerted effort to identify and judge the potential benefit of a given
study, such as is called for by Dr. Levine, with particular attention
paid to a sponsor’s ability and motivation to distort data, needs to oc169
cur in any study that is placed before an IRB.
In past centuries, those under his power often justifiably feared
170
the medical researcher.
The researcher characteristically had a robust ego and a sense of being in a battle against disease for the bet171
terment of humanity. Fueled by this sense of mission, a researcher
167

See Walters Interview, supra note 43; see also INTERIM DORSEN REPORT, supra note
14, at D-39.
168
See infra Part IV. For example, drug companies have been successfully sued by
consumers for withholding and falsifying safety and efficacy data as early as the
1950s. Note the cases about the drug MER/29, where side effects such as cataracts,
baldness, severe skin reactions, and sexual depression were not properly disclosed by
the manufacturer. See PAPPWORTH, supra note 71, at 175 (quoting MORTON MINTZ,
THE THERAPEUTIC NIGHTMARE (1971)).
169
Levine, supra note 26. How such an assessment should occur is a complex
question and, in the past, would likely have been the subject of a new commission’s
analysis. However, given the politicizing of the Bioethics Commission enterprise in
recent years, this Article hesitates to make such a recommendation. See Madison
Powers, Bioethics as Politics: The Limits of Moral Expertise, 15 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 305
(2005).
170
PAPPWORTH, supra note 71.
171
See H.K. BEECHER, CLINICAL INVESTIGATION: MEDICAL, ETHICAL, AND MORAL
ASPECTS (1963) (“Any classification of human experimentation as ‘for the good of
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could forgive himself for maltreatment of those who passed through
his hands, and researchers often felt justified in imposing a level of
172
risk on their subjects that would be incomprehensibly high today.
Coupled with the desire to learn something new was a cultural focus
on publication and the corresponding respect of peers in the same
173
Dr. Levine, described earlier as a participant in the reports
fields.
prepared for the Belmont Report, and one of the original and preeminent scholars on clinical research ethics, noted in 1986 that
“[m]ost scientists [were, at that time,] under great pressure to conduct research and publish it. Publication [was] the sole route to professional success, to salary increases, to tenure, to promotion. Scientists, therefore, regard[ed] the terms and conditions of publication as
174
matters of considerable importance.”
Patients were often viewed as tools or raw material by these re175
searchers.
This problem is what the concept of a subject’s selfdetermination or autonomy was meant to address, as described in
176
The requirement of truly informed
Part B of the Belmont Report.
consent, including a serious attempt by the researcher to explain the
risks to be faced by the subject and with the subject holding enough

society’ is to be viewed with distaste, even alarm. Undoubtedly, all sound work has
this as its ultimate aim, but such high-flown expressions are not necessary, and have
been used within living memory as cover for outrageous ends.” (quoted in
PAPPWORTH, supra note 71, at 28)).
172
A highly regarded scientist, in a speech before an international audience in
1961 on what made a brilliant researcher, said that “[t]he desire to alleviate suffering
is of small value in research—such a person should be advised to work for charity.
Research wants egoists, damned egoists, who seek their own pleasure and satisfaction, but find it in solving the puzzles of nature.” PAPPWORTH, supra note 71, at 11
(quoting Dr. Albert Szent-Gyorgi).
173
See Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 181.
174
See ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 28 n.74 (2d
ed. 1986) (quoting Y. Brackbill & A.E. Hellegers, Ethics and Editors, HASTINGS CTR.
REPORT 174 (1980)); see also Norman W. Storer, The Internationality of Science and the
Nationality of Scientists (stating that in 1970, scientists were centrally motivated by
credit, recognition, and celebration by other scientists), in EXPERIMENTATION WITH
HUMAN BEINGS 118 (Jay Katz ed., 1972) [hereinafter EXPERIMENTATION]; Derek J. de
Solla Price, Science Since Babylon, in EXPERIMENTATION, supra, at 116 (researchers “seek
an immortal brainchild in order to perpetuate themselves,” and they refer fondly to a
time when it was possible “for men to fashion bricks of science engraved with their
own names”).
175
See ROBERT VEATCH, THE PATIENT AS PARTNER: A THEORY OF HUMANEXPERIMENTATION ETHICS 208 (1987). Consider the example of William Beaumont,
whose studies on the gastric physiology of his subject, Alexis St. Martin, were made
possible by forcing St. Martin to agree to a lifetime of indentured servitude to Dr.
Beaumont in exchange for Dr. Beaumont agreeing to treat St. Martin’s lifethreatening gunshot wound. Id.
176
Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,193.
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power in the relationship to refuse participation if so inclined, is the
177
primary expression of this notion of autonomy.
The ideal, reflected in the language of the Belmont Report and
the subsequent federal regulations, was to have a balance between
these two aspects of research, the complex and driven desire for a
better world held by researchers and the protection of the subjects of
their research. The regulatory and ethical communities have assumed
up to this point that it was this presumed societal benefit that was in
need of being controlled and kept in balance by vigorously protecting the autonomy of the subjects. The struggle has been perceived as
being over the conflict between the search for knowledge and the
178
subjects’ individual rights. However, beneficence can no longer be
assumed to be a motivator of researchers. In fact, it is probably safe
to assume that beneficence is now the most endangered essential
element of a great deal of medical research.
In 1973, the United States Senate held a series of hearings about
179
human experimentation. The purpose of the hearings was to investigate allegations of abuse of subjects, and the hearings led directly to
180
the creation of the Commission that prepared the Belmont Report.
Many of the prominent figures in research at that time testified at
those hearings and their testimony, in retrospect, gave strong hints as
to the cultural and legal changes the field was on the cusp of experiencing. For example, Dr. Watson, a noted professor of molecular biology at Harvard University, spoke about a fiscal crisis in academic sciences due to government cuts in funding of basic science research in
181
academic institutions.
He and others holding similar positions in
academia spoke of institutions beginning to look for funding from

177

See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 69, with a particular focus on Chapter 7,
The Concept of Autonomy, and Chapter 9, Understanding for a discussion of these
normative concepts.
178
“In the end we have to accept the fact that some limits do exist to the search
for knowledge.” Paul A. Freund, Problems in Human Experimentation, 273 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 687 (1965), quoted in PAPPWORTH, supra note 71, at 7 (1967); see BIOETHICS
COMMISSION, supra note 36, at 3 (noting that researchers have a serious obligation to
science that might conflict with their attention to the interests of participants).
179
See Senate Hearings, supra note 7.
180
See supra Part II.
181
Basic science refers to research that is focused on natural processes rather than
on marketable products. See, e.g., Univ. of S. Cal., Norris Comprehensive Cancer
Center, Glossary, http://uscnorriscancer.usc.edu/health/uscnorris/glossary/index.
html#b (last visited March 2, 2007). It is often a necessary component of the creation of new products but occurs far earlier, often when commercial implications are
unclear. Id.
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different sources, with an accompanying shift in the focus of the re182
search.
To be very clear, the cultural shift described here has been away
from a research enterprise where success was measured by peerreviewed publication in prestigious journals, by achieving tenure and
the respect of peers, and, perhaps, by the ability to generate grant
money for one’s institution. Prior to this shift, most research oc183
curred in an academic setting under the control of the researchers.
Furthermore, the accepted values of the scientific community at that
time included the sharing of information so that it could be challenged, criticized and eventually further developed by subsequent re184
search.
The current climate is different. A deep conflict exists between the regulatory structure we have in place governing the use of
human research subjects and the regulatory structure we have in
place governing the manufacture and sale of pharmaceuticals and
185
The ultimate goal of the regulatory structure in
medical devices.
place for drug companies is to improve the common good, and in
furtherance of this goal we have created a regulatory structure that
gives drug companies rights to control much or all of the data they
generate using human research subjects. Even when the data is directly applicable to safety and effectiveness of a given drug and is
submitted to a federal agency, the government pledges to keep it se186
cret.
The idea underlying this secrecy and control is that making drug
development profitable will encourage more and better drug development and so that we, as a society, will experience a net gain in well182

See Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 511–12 (testimony of James D. Watson, Professor of Molecular Biology, Harvard University).
183
See, e.g., BARRY, supra note 73 (giving a detailed account of the medical establishment in the early 1900s).
184
See, e.g., Norman W. Storer, The Internationality of Science and the Nationality of
Scientists (asserting that scientific knowledge requires an opportunity for competent
response and that availability to other scientists is an “intrinsic value” of scientific research), in EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 174, at 118; see also Karl W. Deutsch, Scientific and Humanistic Knowledge in the Growth of Civilization (“Science itself depends for
its life on the acceptance of certain fundamental values, such as the value of curiosity
and learning, the value of truth, the value of sharing knowledge with others [and]
the value of respect for facts . . . .”), in EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 174, at 121.
185
See Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 365 (2006) (discussing theoretical conflicts within the regulations that
govern health law).
186
Under the scheme that regulates drug companies, the FDA has been highly
protective of pharmaceutical company control of this data. See generally Pub. Citizen
Health Research Group v. FDA, 997 F.Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1998); Pub. Citizen Health
Research Group v. FDA, 539 F.Supp. 1320 (D.D.C. 1982).

FOX_FINAL

634

4/11/2008 8:02:10 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:605

being. The ability to keep information secret will, in theory, increase
profitability. If profitability is the driver of progress, this furthers the
goal of society that a net “good” will occur. One can, and perhaps
one should, debate the soundness of this policy and its underlying assumptions. This Article does not do so. Here, the policy of utilizing
profitability to encourage drug development is utilized as a legal and
historical description of how we function and the choices we have
made, rather than presenting it as successful or unsuccessful, coherent or deeply flawed.
The justification of a net societal gain is inapplicable within the
framework of the regulations of human subject research because of
the beneficence requirement. What we end up with are dueling justifications, and hence the resulting conflicting regulatory structures.
When testing pharmaceuticals, we must satisfy all necessary requirements of human subject research, one of which is that the particular
project must be calculated to generate knowledge for the good of
187
And yet our drug regulatory structure allows this very
mankind.
same knowledge to be kept secret, to be manipulated and to be distorted in its presentation to society, a direct affront to this first requirement of benefit.
To state it succinctly, the good of society, writ broadly as it is in
the justification for our drug regulatory structure, cannot be used to
justify the suppression of data generated by using human research
subjects. This is because one cannot use a broad societal benefit of
an entire industry to satisfy the legal requirement of a potential benefit within the human research subject analysis.
In concrete terms, consider the following example: DrugCo is a
drug company. It is allowed to consider using Joe Smith as a research
subject to try a new drug if what it learns from Mr. Smith is likely to
help us all in the future (thus satisfying the benefit requirement).
DrugCo uses him, finds out something important and yet suppresses
the very knowledge the researchers have learned, the hopes of which
justified using Mr. Smith in the first place, thus depriving other researchers or physicians from knowing the results that were discovered. In this scenario something violative of human research ethics
and regulations has occurred. A necessary element of ethical research on human beings has been compromised, and so the research
does not satisfy the relevant regulations embodied in the Belmont
188
Report.

187
188

Belmont Report, supra note 8, at 23,194.
Id.
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Pharmaceutical companies now exercise control over how research is conducted in academic institutions to a degree that was un189
heard of in the 1970s, effectively “load[ing] the dice to make sure
190
their drugs look good.”
Trials performed or funded by drug companies to prove the safety and efficacy of their products “can be
rigged in a dozen ways, and it happens all the time” in order to make
191
the results appear more positive than they might otherwise seem.
Beginning in the 1980s, academic researchers began to see themselves as partners of the drug industry, and a measurable pro-industry
192
The decision
bias began to appear in published medical research.
as to whether to publish data or conclusions derived from studies is
193
often controlled by the drug companies. Researchers do not necessarily have to internalize a pro-industry bias, as they are often bound
by contracts that give the sponsor of the study the right to control
publication and all other forms of dissemination of the data derived
194
from the study. As will be illustrated by the SSRI case study in Part
IV, this lack of control over the findings of a study can present significant ethical problems for researchers but, even given those known
problems, confidentiality or nondisclosure agreements are still commonplace between the people conducting the research and the spon195
soring drug or device manufacturer whose product is being tested.
It is particularly enlightening for purposes of describing the current
189

Krimsky, supra note 76, at 70–74.
ANGELL, supra note 2, at xviii. Dr. Angell recently stepped down as editor of
the New England Journal of Medicine, where she worked for thirty years. The New
England Journal of Medicine, along with the Lancet and the Journal of the American
Medical Association, is one of the most prestigious medical journals in the world today. For an example of a study design that serves to accomplish this type of goal,
consider events related to the Pfizer drug trials conducted in Nigeria, where Pfizer
was alleged to have used purposefully low doses of the accepted treatment for meningitis in children to enhance the comparative performance of their own drug, which
was the subject of the trial. See AURORA PLOMER, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF MEDICAL
RESEARCH: INTERNATIONAL BIOETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (2005).
191
ANGELL, supra note 2, at 95.
192
See Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in
Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454, 454–63 (2003) (presenting a
statistical analysis of the impact of drug company sponsorship of studies and showing
a persistent and large increase in the number of pro-industry outcomes when the
studies are financed by drug companies); see also ANGELL, supra note 2, at 8.
193
Bekelman, supra note 192, at 463.
194
Id.
195
Guidelines promulgated by the International Committee of Medical Journal
Editors (ICMJE) forbid these agreements, but a study published in the New England
Journal of Medicine in October 2002 concluded that these guidelines were not being
followed, and articles that fail to follow them were still being published. See K.A.
Schulman et al., A National Survey of Provisions in Clinical-Trial Agreements between Medical Schools and Industry Sponsors, 347 N. ENG. J. MED. 1335, 1339 (2002).
190
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culture that researchers have reported feeling powerless in negotiations with corporate sponsors regarding confidentiality and publication rights even though the contracts may be in direct defiance of
196
The academic institutions where
journal publication guidelines.
many of these researchers work have ceded levels of control over
their studies to the sponsors to a degree that has prompted much
197
Many of the studies now conducted are done merely to
criticism.
satisfy regulatory requirements, rather than for the purpose of generating information deemed relevant by the researcher, making the desirable outcome easy to determine in advance and its success finan198
cially critical to the study sponsor.
A series of legislative and regulatory actions have helped create
the incentives for the problematic changes described above. The
primary piece of legislation responsible for cementing attitudes re199
garding control of data is FOIA, as interpreted by the FDA to protect safety and efficacy data of drug companies from disclosure to the
200
201
202
The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, the Bayh-Dole Act,
public.
and the various legislative schemes designed to increase and encour203
age drug testing on children have also been important.
A. Freedom of Information Act
Starting in 1962, the FDA’s mandate from Congress required
applicants who sought FDA approval for marketing of pharmaceuticals to show both safety and effectiveness of those drugs, which in
turn required the use of drug trials on human subjects to generate

196

Id.
ANGELL, supra note 2, at 103; see also Krimsky, supra note 76, at 61.
198
This raises the question as to whether it is ever appropriate to use human research subjects for purposes of regulatory approval. It may very well turn out to be
appropriate, but the work of determining this has not yet been done. This is one of
numerous analytical problems that need to be examined in light of a newly invigorated concept of beneficence.
199
See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
200
The author would like to thank Dr. Ruth Faden for her helpful insights regarding the FOIA that she gave when this article was presented in an earlier form in Baltimore in 2005.
201
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 35
U.S.C.).
202
Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, 35 U.S.C. §§
200–212 (2000).
203
See, e.g., Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat.
1408 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
197
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204

the data.
To support drug applications, drug companies submit
large amounts of data to the FDA consisting of “thousands of pages of
proprietary data, including both trade secrets and confidential busi205
ness statistical data.” Some contend that the FDA “possesses among
its routinely collected files some of the most sensitive nonmilitary
206
The drug industry
data in the whole universe of federal records.”
has gone to great lengths to prove the financial competitive value of
its safety and efficacy data contained in these files, including sponsor207
The financial
ing a number of studies by economists on this topic.
value of the secrecy of this data has not been seriously questioned by
any commentators.
The FDA has consistently committed to keeping this data secret.
When FOIA was written in the 1970s, the goal was to increase citizen
208
access to government process.
There are a series of exceptions to
what the government is required to release in response to a FOIA re209
quest.
The exception relevant here is for non-governmental, pri210
The FDA has determined that safety and
vate sector trade secrets.
efficacy data submitted by drug companies in support of applications
before the FDA will be protected from disclosure in response to FOIA
211
This decision was the
requests under the trade secret exemption.
subject of debate when it was made in the early 1970s and is still sub212
ject to criticism. Congress did not specifically include safety and efficacy data in the trade secret exemption, but it has also not acted to
change the FDA’s interpretation since it was published in the Federal
Register, despite its clear power to do so.
The FDA has received tens of thousands of FOIA requests from
213
corporations for other corporations’ filings.
“Perhaps 85 percent
204

Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2602(6) (2000); ANGELL, supra note
2, at 34.
205
1 JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 14:92 (3d ed. 2000).
206
Id.
207
Id. For example, Study to Assess Impacts of Releasing Safety and Effectiveness Data on
the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Incentives to Invest in and Conduct Research and Development
Programs, was conducted by Pracon, Inc. and submitted to the FDA in 1978. Id. §
14:92 n.6.
208
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000).
209
Id. § 552(b).
210
Id. § 552(b)(4).
211
Public Information, 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,603 (Dec. 24, 1974) (codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 90, 121, 135, 146, 312, 314, 431, 601, 720, and 730).
212
See, e.g., FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14; Letter from Donald Kennedy,
Commissioner, FDA, to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, U.S. Senate (May 5, 1978) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Kennedy Letter].
213
O’REILLY, supra note 205, § 14:92.
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of the FDA’s 30,000 annual FOIA requests at the height of its pre[I]nternet FOIA period had come from businesses seeking other
214
The corporate identity of the information seekers
firms’ reports.”
strongly supports a conclusion that there is a commercial motivation
to these requests. This, coupled with the expressed concerns of the
drug manufacturers whose data is at risk, appears to have influenced
agency response, taking the position that it needs to protect the financial interests of the industry it regulates from those who would
215
unfairly benefit from others’ work product.
It is quite simple to show that FOIA releases of safety and efficacy
data can create a commercial harm for drug companies, as has been
done in a number of studies. To quote from one of the early studies
conducted to assess this potential harm:
[S]afety and efficacy data that is submitted to the FDA as part of a
drug approval process serves to confirm or refute scientific hypotheses about class[es] of drugs—a process of information that
is extremely valuable for the second or subsequent research firms,
which would not need to look at those particular drug entities [to
establish the information already proven]. If the data from FDA
files were disclosed, there would be a change in the research pattern of [the drug industry,] arguably worsening the burdens on
216
United States pharmaceutical innovation.

In a world committed to creating financial incentives for drug
217
It will serve to
companies, the cost of releasing the data is clear.
diminish the financial incentives for drug companies by reducing
their profitability.
There are other costs to a drug company from releasing safety
and efficacy data. Data is vulnerable to manipulation in how it is presented and in the results it claims to prove. If other scientists are
given access to this same data, they can analyze and criticize the tri214

Id. § 10:1.
See WILLIAM L. CASEY, JR. ET AL., ENTREPRENEURSHIP, PRODUCTIVITY, AND THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 169 (1983) (giving an in-depth discussion of these
concerns from a drug company perspective).
216
O’REILLY, supra note 205. This analysis is derived from a study referred to as
the most comprehensive analysis of the impacts of FOIA on the pharmaceutical industry in the 1980s, when the issue was still being hotly debated. CASEY, JR. ET AL., supra note 215.
217
For an example of federal court acceptance of the validity of this economic
analysis, see Tri-Bio Laboratories, Inc., v. U.S., 836 F.2d 135, 138–41 (3d Cir. 1987)
(noting that the economics of drug research tend to discourage full test data dissemination). See also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984)
(finding that the submitter of test data to the FDA continues to have a reasonable
expectation that the law and regulations will continue to protect commercial value of
the test data).
215
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als.
Drug companies risk being challenged on the design of the
study, the interpretations of study results, and the way negative trial
events are recorded. These are the types of costly events that occurred with the FDA’s analysis of SSRIs in a pediatric population, as
discussed in Part IV. It is not difficult to surmise that the risk to drug
company interests increases if other scientists outside of government
employment are given access to the same quality of information
available to the FDA. Claims of safety or efficacy are vulnerable to being refuted with very little financial or time investment on the part of
those who would challenge them. A further risk is that with access to
preliminary data, it becomes easier to design studies that compare
the effectiveness of one treatment with another, or with a series of
others. Drug companies under the current regulatory system do not
have to prove that a new product performs better than current prod219
Thus, a
ucts; it merely must be proven to outperform a placebo.
new drug that either performs significantly worse than those currently on the market or that can offer only a minor improvement
with a significant cost increase can be approved and marketed. Any
heightened exposure to comparative cost-benefit data that could influence patients, doctors, and, perhaps more importantly, third-party
payers, is a significant financial risk for drug companies.
The analysis of the impact of FDA protection of FOIA disclosures of safety and efficacy data is strikingly different when analyzed
from the perspective of human-research-subject regulation. The
fundamental requirement of a benefit to be derived from research on
human subjects brings with it a need to view structures that materially
lessen these benefits with some concern. One clear goal of the human-research-subject regulations in the United States should be to
reduce the number of persons who will be subjects of research to the
smallest number possible to accomplish the identified benefit, thus
reducing the overall risk of any given project and ensuring that no
one person is sacrificing himself unnecessarily. A second goal should
be to have the benefit be as robust as possible and to have the accomplishments of any given study resonate as broadly as possible in
terms of what they add to the knowledge base of humankind. Here,
in the FOIA exception debate, we have a series of studies and assertions that proving the FDA’s protection of the safety and efficacy data
of drug companies will result in repetitive studies being conducted,
because one company will not be able to build on what another com-

218
219

Krimsky, supra note 76, at 63.
21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2006).
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220

pany has already proven.
Thus, this secrecy makes it highly likely
that more people will be used as research subjects in situations where
their participation is difficult, if not impossible, to justify within the
scheme envisioned by the current human research subject regulations. We also know from this same debate that the scientific community as a whole will not move forward as quickly as it could if it
were given full access to this information, thus minimizing the potential benefit of the knowledge gained from any given study.
Viewed from the perspective of human research subject ethics
and regulations, the drug industry arguments presented in defense of
FOIA exemptions show an industry that early on lost sight of its obligations as a participant in, and beneficiary of, research on human
subjects. It also shows a deep and persistent conflict between protect221
ing competitive advantage and maximizing societal benefit.
The FDA, responding to the concerns of the drug companies
and recognizing the financial value of the information it received
from them, agreed to extend trade secret protection to safety and ef222
ficacy data. However, that agreement did not come from a unified
FDA. While the regulatory ramifications of a reduction in benefit derived from a study were not perceived by any of the commentators in
terms of human research subject regulations, the actual reduction of
223
A letter
societal benefit itself was a cause of tremendous concern.
written by Dr. Donald Kennedy while he was the Commissioner of the
FDA in 1978 shows his concerns regarding the impact of secrecy in
224
this area. The letter, written to United States Senator Edward Kennedy, argues for the release of safety and effectiveness data submitted
225
to it by drug companies.
He takes the position that government
decisions should, whenever possible, be based on publicly available

220

O’REILLY, supra note 205, § 14:92 n.6.
The argument that data suppression minimizes societal benefit is fairly
straightforward as regards the benefit that can accrue from an individual research
project, but the arguments presented in this Article about the impact of suppression
on the scientific community as a whole tend to support the argument that benefit,
across the society, is being negatively impacted by this phenomenom.
222
See O’REILLY, supra note 205.
223
This is evidenced by several documents. See FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note
15l; McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 13; Kennedy Letter, supra note 212.
224
Kennedy Letter, supra note 212. Donald Kennedy has a Ph.D. in biology. In
light of this Article’s assertion that a change in culture has led to a reduction of data
dissemination, it is interesting to read the perspective of Dr. Kennedy, a scientist who
was trained at Harvard in the earlier culture, on the risks he perceived from this FDA
policy.
225
Id.
221
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226

information.
More relevant to this point, he refers to peer review
and the publication of scientific information as the system “at the
heart of the scientific process . . . a fundamental requirement of science that hypotheses and conclusions of one scientist be subjected to
public examination, criticism, and debate by other scientists before
227
Furthermore, he wrote, “secrecy is antitheir validity is accepted.”
thetical to good science, . . . [and] release of safety and efficacy data
228
would promote the spread and growth of scientific knowledge.”
Dr. Kennedy quotes from a presidential Scientific Advisory
Committee Report from 1973, written by a committee appointed by
the Nixon administration, stating that “[n]ot allowing the academic
research community access to the retained results of safety testing is
believed to have adversely affected progress in the understanding of
the presence or absence of unfortunate effects of chemicals on peo229
ple.”
He then writes, “[i]n assessing the impact of release of the
data on drug innovation, it is important to consider that release of
data would increase general knowledge, reduce error and waste, and
thereby reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of drug re230
search.” Given that the
FDA is one of the largest repositories of drug information in the
world . . . on matters such as pharmacokinetics, estimation of
human risks from animal studies, potential new uses for older
drugs, and techniques to reduce human risk and increase the scientific validity of drug testing, information of immense value to
humanity may be locked away in the agency’s files . . . . Release of
safety and effectiveness data would also encourage the improved
231
design and more careful execution of studies.

Furthermore, Dr. Kennedy remarked that “[t]he opportunity for review by scientists outside the agency will provide a valuable additional
incentive for drug sponsors to produce the best and most reliable
232
data.”
In 1977, Norman Dorsen headed a government-appointed panel
233
on drug regulations that commented on the possible impact of this
type of secrecy. Dr. Kennedy refers to that panel’s conclusions in his
letter, stating that he has ethical concerns about “routinely treating as
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233

Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Krimsky, supra note 76.
Kennedy Letter, supra note 212.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14.
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‘proprietary’ research involving human subjects,” at least partially due
to concerns that this secrecy may diminish the subjects’ contributions
234
to humanity.
Both Dr. Kennedy and Mr. Dorsen recognized an ethical problem in keeping safety and efficacy data secret, but neither of them
saw the direct relationship between this problem and the regulatory
235
Under the Belmont
requirements of research on human subjects.
Report, there is a legal mandate that this “contribution to humanity”
236
be respected and not unduly minimized. In effect, it is possible for
the suppression or manipulation of data derived from these studies to
undermine the benefits of the study initially presented to the IRB for
approval under the guise of prospectively contributing to humankind. The drug companies lost sight of the underlying ethical balance between benefit and respect for persons that led to the U.S.
regulations, instead focusing entirely on the impact of any data disclosure on their financial incentives to conduct business. An exam237
ple of this drug industry stance is also in Dr. Kennedy’s letter. Prior
to the creation of the relatively recent regulatory structure that gov238
erns generic drugs, drug companies holding the original patents to
substances were faced with the fact that generic drug manufacturers
could profit from their own work on these substances once the original patent expired. Before Dr. Kennedy wrote his letter, drug company representatives testified before Congress on this issue. Robert
Clark, a drug company industry representative, testified that he
wanted to require generic drug manufacturers to repeat all of the
safety and efficacy studies of the original patent holder, with the goal
of repetitive testing creating a barrier to the generic drug companies’
239
Dr. Kennedy challenged
respective entries into the marketplace.
this notion of repetitive testing for purposes of creating a barrier to
entry in his letter to Senator Kennedy as ethically unacceptable, but
240
he did not go into detail as to why this is so. This would be ethically

234

Kennedy Letter, supra note 212.
This may be based on the timing of the FOIA debate, which occurred soon after the drafting of the Belmont Report and early in the development of the regulations. The ethical concerns were recognized, but it was perhaps not yet clear as to
their legal status.
236
See Belmont Report, supra note 8; see also supra Part II.
237
Kennedy letter, supra note 212.
238
See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 21 and 35 U.S.C.).
239
See Senate Hearings, supra note 7.
240
See Kennedy Letter, supra note 212.
235
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questionable on numerous levels. The human beings who volunteered for the first tests would suffer a diminishment of the benefit
for which they sacrificed. As for new subjects, it exposes them to the
risks of being a test subject with no hope for the possibility of gain for
humankind; a subject of a test with no scientific rationale to justify it
at all. The entire justification of using the second round of human
subjects is to protect economic incentives for drug companies. This is
unacceptable under the federal regulations for human research sub241
What is interesting is how this statement of
jects detailed above.
the drug company executive is made with no apparent awareness of
the implications for human research subjects, a blindness that continues to this day.
The Dorsen Panel was created on February 21, 1975 to assess
242
drug regulations and the functioning of the FDA. It was created by
Caspar Weinberger, then the Secretary of HEW, in response to Senate subcommittee hearings which had raised questions about the
243
FDA’s process of reviewing new drugs.
The Dorsen Panel reported to the Secretary of HEW and had no
244
powers or responsibilities other than preparing its reports. Among
other issues, it examined whether FOIA should protect safety and efficacy data submitted to the FDA as trade secrets and discussed this in
both an interim report issued in November 1976 and the final panel
245
report issued in May 1977.
The panel’s reports were quite critical
of suppression of data, but also failed to connect the two relevant
regulatory schemes—that of the FDA’s drug approval process and the
other used for the regulation of research on human subjects. The interim report states that “[c]urrent trade secrets policy conflicts with
fundamental moral principles that human beings not be subjected to
wasteful new drug testing and that scientific knowledge collected at
246
public risk be publicly disclosed.” Furthermore:
241

See supra Part II.
This panel is quite similar to the more recent Institute of Medicine Panel that
issued its report on the FDA in September of 2006. See COMMITTEE ON THE
ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYSTEM, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY:
PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC (Alina Baciu et al. eds.,
2007), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11750.
243
FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14.
244
Id. Contrasting this with the power of the Commission provides further evidence of the unusual scope of the Commission’s brief.
245
Together, the different interim reports and the final report are referred to as
the Dorsen Report and were cited to in many of the discussions in the late 1970s and
1980s about the role of the FDA in general. See generally INTERIM DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14; FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14.
246
INTERIM DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14, at D1.
242
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[F]ailure to release . . . [safety and effectiveness] data tends to encourage wasteful and unjustifiable duplicative testing in humans.
The failure also interferes withthe free exchange of scientific
knowledge . . . . The sole justification for this trade secrets policy
is that it may protect the market position, and thus the incentive
to innovate, of companies that invest in research and develop247
ment of new drugs.

The Dorsen Panel examined the policy debate that took place in
248
Congress prior to the passage of FOIA.
The debate in Congress
over trade secret protection apparently included problems regarding
safety and efficacy information. As the panel stated, “[p]erhaps the
most controversial question in formulating this policy concerned the
249
status of safety and efficacy test data.”
The report noted that in recent years (that is, recent relative to
1976) the FDA had interpreted the trade secret exemption to extend
250
protection to animal and human test data.
The Dorsen Final Report examined the FDA process as of 1977 and criticized it for its lack
251
One criticism was that
of openness in reviewing drug applications.
252
the system was essentially closed to public review and participation.
The lack of openness stemmed primarily from the FDA’s trade secret
protections that prohibited the FDA from disclosing most scientific
data held by it and thus this trade secret protection prevented the
FDA from releasing to the public information underlying its deci253
sions. The committee was concerned about “suppression of important scientific information about new drugs” and wanted Congress to
see how to encourage research and development without the sup247

Id.
See id.
249
Id. For the language of the regulations discussed in the Dorsen Report, see
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
250
See Safety and Effectiveness Data for New Drugs and New Animal Drugs, 39
Fed. Reg. 44,601 (Dec. 24, 1974); Food and Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 9,
128–29 (May 5, 1972). For purposes of the debate, the FDA defined safety and effectiveness data as “all studies and tests of a drug on animals and humans and all studies
and tests on the drug for identity, stability, purity, potency and bioavailability.” See 21
C.F.R. §§ 314.14(i), 514.11(h), 4.111(e) (1976). This definition treats data that are
very different from one another in terms of the moral and regulatory requirements
imposed on them as though they were the same. Data derived from human subjects,
versus animal studies or studies on the substance itself will have different regulatory
schemes governing those being studied. This Article argues that the fact that the
data is derived from human beings imposes a beneficence requirement upon it that
must be supported by the treatment of that data subsequent to its development.
Data not derived from humans has a different legal status.
251
See FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14.
252
Id. at 2.
253
Id. at 33.
248
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254

pression. The committee called for “closer review of drug testing to
ensure that studies are not misdirected, that human test subjects are
not exposed to undue safety risks, that important drug applications
are not neglected, and that data submitted by drug sponsors are nei255
The Dorsen Panel observed that
ther fraudulent nor misleading.”
“clinical testing of new drugs is defensible only if it offers the possibility of social benefits, [and that] incomplete or inaccurate reporting
of clinical data raises serious questions about the ethics of such test256
ing.”
The FDA’s stated justification for protecting the confidentiality
of this data was based entirely on a financial incentive theory of drug
257
development.
The public is dependant upon private pharmaceutical manufacturers for development of drugs. In some instances [the drug or
substance being tested] may not be patented. If a manufacturer’s
safety and effectiveness data are to be released upon request, thus
permitting “me-too” drugs to be marketed immediately, it is entirely possible that the incentive for private pharmaceutical re258
search will be adversely affected.

The drug industry consistently expressed its concerns that the
FDA needed to make a firm commitment to protecting data disclosed
to it in order to prevent a competitive harm from occurring due to a
broad societal increase in knowledge, which was clearly perceived as a
negative outcome. Once the information became broadly available,
259
it would lose proprietary value to the drug company.
The Dorsen Panel saw this trade secret protection as doing harm
to scientific progress, undermining FDA credibility in decisionmaking and greatly reducing the benefit that could be achieved from
260
the studies that had been conducted. In light of its commitment to
keeping information confidential, the FDA must publicly justify its
decisions regarding drug applications without being able to explicitly
refer to the data upon which the decisions are based. This approach
presents a problem of both credibility and accountability that has not
yet been resolved; furthermore, the FDA is consistently deprived of

254
255
256
257
258
259
260

Id. at 2.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14.
Id. at 34 (quoting 39 Fed. Reg. 44,634 (1974)).
See CASEY, JR. ET AL., supra note 215, at 169.
FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14.
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valuable opinions and challenges from other scientists and the pub261
lic, increasing the risk of arbitrary or irrational decisions.
The Dorsen Panel specifically addressed implications of this policy for human research subjects: “[W]ithout access to supporting
data, informed public debate on controversial decisions and on
broad questions such as the ethics of human testing becomes impos262
sible.”
The Dorsen Panel condemned keeping scientific research
hidden from the public view because it
often forces pharmaceutical companies to engage in testing which
duplicates work already performed by other companies. Because
duplicative testing has little social value, the ethics of such testing
are always questionable. In fact, duplicative testing might lead to
deaths or illnesses which could have been avoided had the inves263
tigator been familiar with another firm’s findings.

The Dorsen Panel further added that the trade secrets policy of the
264
FDA interfered with the free exchange of scientific knowledge. Arguably, this free exchange of information is an intimate part of what
makes research on human subjects proper, as it adds so much to the
value of what is learned. Scientists will not be given access to suppressed data, thus hampering their work by not giving them access to
265
“scientific advances which have a bearing on their own work.”
“One of the most troublesome aspects of [the system] is that the FDA
must rely almost exclusively on the accuracy and objectivity of industry-generated data” without it being subject to the challenges that
266
other scientists might raise.
The submission of inaccurate or misleading data also poses a
problem relating to the ethics of human testing. Although the
testing of new drugs on human volunteers subjects them to unknown risks for unknown benefits, those experiments ordinarily
are justified on the ground that they may produce larger social
gains. When test results do not accurately reflect the outcome of
clinical trials, human test subjects will have been exposed to the
267
risks of an experimental drug without countervailing benefit.

The Dorsen Report, in the end, disagreed with the FDA’s conclusion that trade secret law mandated the position the FDA took re261

The case study presented in Part IV is a good example of these concerns bearing fruit.
262
FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14, at 35.
263
Id.
264
Id. at 35.
265
Id. at 36.
266
Id. at 83.
267
Id.
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garding safety and efficacy data and believed that the FDA could le268
It
gally release this type of data in response to FOIA requests.
269
The
stated that it would also be beneficial for the FDA to do so.
Dorsen Report also called for Congress to address the problem directly since the FDA had reached a contrary decision in its stated
270
That change has not yet occurred, and therefore FDA
policies.
regulations still protect drug companies from disclosure of data under FOIA. The Dorsen Panel concluded that the present safeguards
in the system (those present in 1977 and still roughly the same today)
were not enough to prevent bias in how data was presented to the
FDA, based on a desire by drug companies for a commercially suc271
cessful product.
The FDA failed to properly take into account the impact of its
regulatory decision concerning FOIA release of drug company data
on the regulations governing human subject research. This does not
mean that the duty to comply with the human research subject regulations is an onus upon the FDA. It still rests quite firmly with those
who are proposing to conduct a study. The FDA stance is relevant
because it permits the drug companies to use the data they generate
on human subjects to gain government approval of a product and yet
still fail to satisfy the benefit requirement of the human research
regulations. A countervailing pressure to be forthcoming and open
that could have been generated by the need to satisfy FDA regulations is not present. The debate regarding the FDA’s policy decision
is also relevant because those who have addressed it, including Dr.
Kennedy and the Dorsen Panel, have done an excellent job of detail272
The
ing many of the wrongs that are caused by this FOIA policy.
failure of the analysis in both the letter from Dr. Kennedy and the
273
Dorsen Panel reports was a lack of understanding of the implications of the beneficence requirement of the human subject regulations. Thirty years later, this Article seeks to rectify that omission.

268

FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14.
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id. at 85.
272
See FINAL DORSEN REPORT, supra note 14; Kennedy Letter, supra note 212.
273
This analysis was echoed in a subsequent article in the Harvard Law Review, coauthored by a lead author of the Dorsen Report. See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note
13.
269
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B. The Bayh-Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts
274

The Bayh-Dole Act reflected changes in the culture of research
while also radically accelerating the speed and depth of the changes
that occurred. This Act made it possible for research that was conducted with federal funds to be used for the profit of those conducting it, either by exploiting the technology themselves or by licensing
275
it to another firm.
The Act allows companies to gain a proprietary
interest in drugs and technologies that in the past were controlled by
276
the federal government.
The Bayh-Dole Act specifically changed
prior federal laws that explicitly called for this information to be
277
made public.
The stated rationale for this change was that forprofit business would serve to bring the fruit of technological advances to the public more quickly and efficiently than occurred when
278
information was freely available to all who might seek to utilize it.
The legislation seeks to “promote the commercialization and public
279
The government maintains
availability of [these] inventions.”
rights in what is covered under the Act, but primarily for purposes of
280
ensuring that the full market potential is actually pursued.
Congress also enacted a confidentiality provision in the Act that allows
the relevant federal agency to choose to keep any information related
to specific inventions confidential so that the interested private par281
ties have time to pursue a patent.
Consider the impact this could have on an academic research institution, and, furthermore, on the large drug companies. First, the
researcher is given the option of pursuing research under federal
grants, with the added possibility of becoming wealthy due to exclu-

274

Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, 35 U.S.C. §§
200–212 (2000).
275
See id.
276
Id.
277
For example, the explicitly changes the laws governing the Department of Agriculture, specifically, 7 U.S.C. § 1624(a) (2000), which governed research grants and
contracts to conduct research and concluded, prior to Bayh-Dole, that “[a]ny contract made pursuant to this section shall contain requirements making the result of
such research and investigations available to the public by such means as the Secretary of Agriculture shall determine.” This type of language was consistent across federal agencies prior to the Bayh-Dole Act. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research
and Private Development, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1663 n.2 (1996).
278
See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000).
279
Id.
280
Id. § 203. This section of the Act discusses what are known as “March-In
Rights.”
281
See id. § 205.
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sive rights in whatever marketable advances might be discovered.
This introduces a new set of motivations into the researcher’s decision-making that was entirely absent when the federal government
maintained the rights to these results. Failure to prove that a drug or
device works well presents a possibility of financial loss to the researcher. Given the amount of money that is usually involved in
bringing a drug or device to market, most researchers license these
283
products to large drug companies. Thus, the goals of the researchers and the drug companies can easily become aligned due to consistent financial pressures on both of them. Furthermore, the drug
companies no longer have the same motivation to invest in new technologies, given that under Bayh-Dole, it is far less risky to allow the
federal government to finance the development of new technologies
and drugs that the drug companies will then take through the approval process and market.
Bayh-Dole then has served to remove much data that was derived
through the use of human research subjects from the public domain,
resulting in what presumably is a predictable subsequent reduction in
scientific benefit from secrecy of data, which has already been described in some detail in this Article. Furthermore, the Act creates
financial incentives for researchers to distort and manipulate data
such that they and their institutions can profit from the resulting
product’s profitability. Finally, Bayh-Doyle continues the research institutions’ cultural shift away from pursuing a social benefit, as originally conceived, and satisfaction from scientific results of research
that increase the knowledge of human kind toward a different policy
concept of benefit. This benefit is measured by the success of the
drug companies, as drug company profitability and social good are
conflated into one measurement.
The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 was created primarily for the
purpose of making it possible for generic drugs to be approved by the
FDA without requiring the same level of testing to show proof of

282

See id. § 203. Under the March-In Rights retained by the federal government,
if the researcher decides to forgo pursuing profit, the rights of that researcher can
simply be taken away and passed to someone the government believes will pursue it
more vigorously. See id.
283
PhRMA estimates that it costs about $800 million to bring a drug to market.
PHARMA PROFILE, supra note 5, at 10 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
NIH, SUMMARY OF THE FY2007 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET (2006), http://www.nih.gov/
news/budget/FY2006presbudget.pdf).
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safety and efficacy that the non-generic drug required.
A generic
in this instance is substantially the same as a substance that has already been approved by the FDA, and by creating a scheme that primarily required proof that the generic substance did not differ substantially from the older, already approved substance, the generic
285
could be brought to market more efficiently. The Act also gave increased exclusivity rights to the manufacturers of the original drugs
286
as a trade-off. The generics cannot be brought to market for a substantial period of time, allowing the original marketer time to profit
287
from its monopoly.
One would think that this law could have served to make it possible for drug companies to be open about the data they controlled,
since their rights were both more completely protected with the extension of exclusivity and were more concretely limited, given the explicit approval of bringing generic drugs to market that piggy-back on
drug-company approvals already conducted by the FDA. This has not
occurred. What did happen is that, during the debate about generics
(which is still ongoing), the drug companies have maintained that
the data is theirs, developed for their own profit, and that generics
288
should have to conduct the research again themselves. This is particularly interesting in light of the fact that the source of much of the
original inventions being debated is government-funded research,
later licensed to the drug companies for exploitation under Bayh289
Dole.
The reasons public disclosure of this information tends to be financially costly to the drug companies are remarkably similar to the
reasons this Article argues they need to be made public. The motivation for the call for disclosure is to reassert the original, and still
binding, ethical legal structure that was built around the complex issue of how to use human beings as research subjects. The incentive
structure that has developed since the 1970s for drug companies was
misinformed and poorly planned in light of drug company dependency on human research subjects. It cannot coexist with human research subject regulations as they now stand. The parties involved,
284

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 35
U.S.C.).
285
35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000).
286
See id.
287
See id.
288
See Kennedy Letter, supra note 212.
289
See ANGELL, supra note 2, at 8 (discussing the amount of new technology being
generated by drug companies themselves).
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from government agencies to the drug companies themselves, should
have recognized this flaw. With disclosure of study results, innovation
would move more quickly, basic research would not need to be repeated, and people could “free ride” on the work done by others, a
term used in a pejorative way in the economic studies prepared by
290
the drug industry though this is exactly what a free exchange of scientific information is meant to accomplish. The current treatment of
safety and efficacy data appears to slow the rate of learning and development at a society-wide level in order to, in theory, encourage it
on an individual company’s part. If we could, indeed, free-ride on
one company’s development of information from the test data it controls and thus move more quickly toward an improved drug or away
from a faulty one, this would seem to be an ideal achievement from
the perspective of a risk-benefit analysis of a study, adding significantly to the possible benefits that could be derived. Clearly, that is
not the goal of current research culture.
IV. CASE STUDY OF SSRIS IN A PEDIATRIC POPULATION
Current events have presented case studies that show the risk of
corporate suppression of important data derived from volunteer re291
search subjects is more than a theoretical concern.
The primary
case examined here is the suppression of data concerning the danger
and lack of efficacy associated with children’s antidepressants. This
information started to become public knowledge in the summer of
2003 when GlaxoSmithKline (Glaxo) applied for British approval for
292
the use of Paxil, an SSRI, in a pediatric population. The SSRI class
also includes Prozac and other commonly prescribed anti293
depressants.
Within two weeks of receiving the application, Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), the British regulatory agency charged with reviewing these applications, con294
traindicated the use of Paxil in patients under the age of eighteen.
290

See, e.g., O’REILLY, supra note 205, § 14:93. This book, written for FOIA practitioners, is solely concerned with the financial costs to enterprise from inappropriate
FOIA disclosures and offers a valuable perspective on the industry concerns.
291
Berenson, supra note 22.
292
See FDA’s Role in Protecting Public Health: Examining FDA’s Review of Safety & Efficacy Concerns in Anti-Depressant Use by Children: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 4–5 (2004)
[hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Rep. Joe Barton, Chairman of House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce).
293
More than ten million children a year are prescribed antidepressants, as of
2004. Id. at 6.
294
This was first reported in the press in June 2003. See, e.g., Sarah Boseley, Mood
Drug Seroxat Banned for Under 18s, THE GUARDIAN, Jun. 11, 2003, available at http://
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In December 2003, MHRA contraindicated all antidepressants, except for Prozac, for children, due to an increase in suicidal behaviors
295
This, in turn, prompted a
combined with failure to show efficacy.
number of articles in the popular press about the possible dangers of
296
these drugs.
In the United States, Congress convened hearings on
this subject in the fall of 2004 calling for the FDA to explain how
these drugs were on the market and freely available to the pediatric
population in the U.S., given the dangers that the studies had dis297
closed.
It is important to note here that these studies on children were
conducted primarily as a result of widespread concern over the lack
298
of available data about how drugs work in children.
For decades,
children have been perceived as a vulnerable population that needs
to be protected from exploitation, and so have been prevented from
299
participating in most drug trials as subjects. This led to limited scientific understanding of how drugs are metabolized by children’s
bodies, which in turn led to a series of policy decisions meant to encourage an ethical and appropriate increase in the use of children as
300
The goal was to begin to fill in what science
research subjects.
301
knows little about: how drugs work in children.
We have learned much about the drug industry’s behavior since
MHRA made its initial finding against Glaxo’s application in 2003.
This Part describes how there have been numerous studies that support a finding of increased suicidal thoughts among children, and
probably adults, when using these antidepressants, and that these
studies began to generate this information at least as long ago as
302
The drug companies that controlled this data did not make
1996.
www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,974901,00.html. The use of the word
“contraindicated” has a slightly different meaning in England than it does in the
United States. In England it is not a ban on prescribing the substance but is, instead,
a harsh warning as to the risks of doing so. In the United States it is highly unusual
for a physician to prescribe a substance that has been “contraindicated” by the FDA
as a treatment, and thus the impact of such a communication is effectively a ban. Id.
295
Id.
296
See, e.g., Erica Goode, British Ignite a Debate on Drugs and Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2003, at F1.
297
See House Hearings, supra note 292, at 490.
298
See, e.g., Connie Lenz, Prescribing a Legislative Response: Educators, Physicians, and
Psychotropic Medication for Children, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 72 (2005).
299
COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 527–32.
300
Id.
301
See, e.g., Jerome Groopman, The Pediatric Gap: Why Have Most Medications Never
Been Properly Tested on Kids?, NEW YORKER, Jan. 10, 2005, at 32.
302
See House Hearings, supra note 292, at 490 (citing Letter from James F. Knudsen,
FDA, to Martha A. Brumfield, Senior Associate Director, Pfizer, Inc.) (“We note that
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it public, and these same companies went to great efforts to make
sure no one else who also had access to the information went public
303
This failure to be forthcoming about these studies caused
with it.
at least two distinct problems. First, it prevented physicians and parents from making the best possible individualized risk-benefit decisions for depressed children. The efficacy issue goes to the possible
benefit of a treatment, which in this case has never been proven to
304
occur at a rate higher than placebo.
The increase in suicidal
thoughts goes to the risk to be considered, and so both sides of the
equation as presented to the public were inaccurate. The second
problem is that without disclosure of the risks, even if a decision
would have been made to go forward with the treatment, children
would not be monitored for occurrences of the side effects that the
research had revealed, making it more likely that occurrences of side
effects would be under-reported and under-treated.
This case study is particularly important here because the data
about these drugs was derived through the use of volunteers, specifically, depressed children who became research subjects rather than
simply receiving the care their personal physicians thought best. All
of the participants were suffering to a sufficient degree to be consid305
ered clinically depressed.
These trials were primarily placebo-

there appears to be an increase [sic] frequency of reports of suicidally [sic] in the
pediatric/adolescent patients exposed to sertraline compared to either placebo or
sertraline-treated adult OCD [obsessive-compulsive disorder] patients.”)); see also id.
at 58 (statement of Greg Walden, Vice Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations, citing Memorandum from Dr. Andrew Mosholder, Medical Officer,
FDA, to Sulvay Pharmaceuticals (Dec. 13, 1996)) (regarding Luvoxamine maleate
(Luvox), an SSRI, which stated that the incidence of agitation among the pediatric
population taking this drug in the test was four times greater than that of the placebo
group, and that “there is emerging literature pointing to behavioral reactions to SSRI
drugs in children”).
303
See, e.g., Complaint at 1, People v. Glaxosmithkline (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 2,
2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/jun/jun2b_04_attach1.
pdf.
304
E. Jane Garland, Facing the Evidence: Antidepressant Treatment in Children and Adolescents, 17 CAN. MED. ASS’N. J. 489 (2004).
305
Careful subject selection can be important because it increases the coherency
of a study, making the results more reliable. However, it can also limit the usefulness
of the information for the general population because the group in the trial is narrowly defined. In the case of antidepressants, the inclusion/exclusion criterion is
very limiting, and results in the selection of a very small percentage of people who
would actually present at their physician’s office complaining of depression. See
Mark Zimmerman et al., Are Subjects in Pharmacological Treatment Trials of Depression
Representative of Patients in Routine Clinical Practice?, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 469, 469
(2002).
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controlled, meaning that a significant percentage of the subjects re306
ceived sugar pills.
These studies involved at least two kinds of predictable risks for
the children, both common in placebo trials. The first was being
placed in the placebo “arm” of the trial and not receiving the most
effective treatment at the earliest possible time if the placebo arm of
the trial proved to be less effective than the arm given the SSRI. The
second risk was the negative effects of the drugs themselves, a risk
that in these trials materialized as a substantially increased incidence
of suicidal ideations, meaning an increase in thoughts about suicide
and an increase in actions taken to harm oneself.
A number of studies conducted over the past fifteen years show
SSRIs are no more effective in children and adolescents than a pla307
cebo, and present a substantial risk of suicidality.
These studies
were conducted on human subjects under the age of eighteen who
308
Glaxo paid for many of these
were symptomatic with depression.
309
studies and other pharmaceutical companies funded the others.
The physicians who conducted these studies were bound by confiden310
tiality agreements with the manufacturers who sponsored them.
These agreements forbid the physicians to independently disclose
311
any results of these studies.
Dr. Andrew Mosholder, a child psychiatrist at the FDA, reviewed
the clinical data about Paxil drug trials in pediatric populations and
observed that some trial events reported under the column of clinical
trial adverse events as “emotional liability” were actually severe
312
enough to qualify as suicidal behavior or ideation. He then had the
FDA request clarification from Glaxo as to these events, asking it to
search its records using search terms the FDA generated that were
313
more likely to reveal the more severe events. In March 2003, Glaxo
gave Dr. Mosholder the data he requested and it showed an increase
306

See, e.g., Garland, supra note 304.
Id. at 489; see Gardiner Harris, Debate Resumes on the Safety of Depression’s Wonder
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2003, at A1.
308
Garland, supra note 304, at 489.
309
See House Hearings, supra note 292, at 22 (statement of Dr. Andrew Mosholder,
Medical Officer, FDA).
310
Id. at 22.
311
See id. at 22; see also Harris, supra note 307.
312
House Hearings, supra note 292, at 22. Adverse events in a clinical trial can
mean a multitude of things and may or may not be connected to the drug or procedure being tested. It is not a simple task to deduce if an event is related to the trial
or will prove to be statistically relevant. Manipulating adverse event reporting can
hide much that could prove relevant.
313
Id.
307
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in suicidal thoughts and behaviors in those children taking Paxil com314
In July 2003, the FDA asked
pared with those taking the placebo.
the other manufacturers of SSRIs to analyze their data the same way
Glaxo had, using FDA-derived search terms to check for adverse
events that needed to be reported separately from the “emotional li315
Dr. Mosholder analyzed all of the data in the fall
ability” category.
of 2003, and subsequently prepared a report showing that these severe adverse events were 1.9 times more likely to occur with the drugs
316
than with placebos.
Glaxo prepared the analysis that Dr. Mosholder requested in the
spring of 2003 and sent it to the British agency, MHRA, in the sum317
mer of 2003 along with its application for a license. In effect, it was
Dr. Mosholder’s analysis of Glaxo’s data that caused Glaxo to designate adverse events in a way that then prompted MHRA to issue its
318
The FDA
contraindication of SSRI use in pediatric populations.
did nothing public with this analysis or data until it was leaked to the
press in the United States in February of 2004 that Dr. Mosholder
had assessed the increased risk of suicidality and the FDA was not do319
ing anything to address it. The FDA responded by starting a criminal investigation into who had leaked this confidential information
320
about the drugs to the press.
314

Id.
Id.
316
It has been shown that adverse events are poorly reported in most mental
health trials. This problem is multi-determined, in that economic incentives for not
disclosing the problems are combined with the difficulty of accurately describing
events that can be difficult to objectively assess. See Panagiotis N. Papanikoloau et al.,
Safety Reporting in Randomized Trials of Mental Health Interventions, 161 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1692, 1693–97 (2004) (giving statistics that support this assertion and
calling for standardized reporting of these events). The problem is not limited to
mental health trials; the economic incentives to underreport problems are present in
all areas of drug and device testing. See, e.g., John P.A. Ioannidis & Joseph Lau, Completeness of Safety Reporting in Randomized Trials: An Evaluation of 7 Medical Areas, 285
JAMA 437 (2001).
317
See House Hearings, supra note 292, at 23–26 (statement of Dr. Andrew
Mosholder, Medical Officer, FDA).
318
There was a suspicion among some at the FDA that the drug companies had
hidden the adverse events by “various inappropriate coding maneuvers.” House Hearings, supra note 292, at 135 (citing E-mail from Russell G. Katz to Dr. Andrew
Mosholder, Medical Officer, FDA (June 3, 2003)).
319
See Goode, supra note 296.
320
The FDA’s focus was on protecting drug company safety and efficacy data from
inadvertent disclosure, even when it was the FDA’s own analysis of that data that had
been disclosed. The investigation was ordered by Dr. Seligman of the FDA, who has
justified his actions by stating that even though the information being leaked was not
proprietary or a trade secret, it was “confidential” and should not have been released
by the FDA. See House Hearings, supra note 292, at 118 (statement of Dr. Paul Selig315
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One issue here was the statistical validity of the increased risk
that the SSRI data presented. Dr. Mosholder stated that the conclusion he reached about the danger was much more convincing when
he put the data from all of the different studies from the drug com321
panies together, giving him a larger data pool to analyze.
When
looking at the data from an individual study, “it is harder to have the
same level of confidence that you have when you combine all the
322
studies.”
Dr. Mosholder was scheduled to present his research to an FDA
advisory panel of experts concerning treatment for pediatric depres323
sion.
This advisory panel would then make recommendations to
the FDA. The administration at the FDA did not let him present his
conclusions, and this decision apparently led to the leak and to accusations in the press of an attempt by the FDA to suppress his analy324
sis.
The FDA claimed it was worried that presenting Mosholder’s
analysis would be misleading to the public, and it would not let him
325
The fear, oft
present until further analysis of the issue occurred.
repeated in hearings before Congress on this issue, was that people
would stop prescribing the SSRIs for pediatric depression if faced
with the data, and the administration wasn’t sure that was the best re326
sponse.
The FDA has received a tremendous amount of criticism
327
for its handling of the matter of children’s use of antidepressants.
man, FDA). This does not create a clear justification for a criminal charge, but as
will be discussed in more detail, it reveals the culture at the FDA regarding information it has that could impact the profitability of drug companies.
321
Id.
322
Id. at 29. The FDA had access to much of the data on SSRIs from the different
companies that manufacture them, allowing Dr. Mosholder to perform this analysis
on the large pool. There are many drugs that share common properties or chemical
structures and pooling of the data may reveal important statistical information.
323
House Hearings, supra note 292, at 29 (statement of Dr. Andrew Mosholder,
Medical Officer, FDA).
324
For more on Dr. Mosholder’s role in the SSRI problem with the FDA, see Greg
Koski, FDA and the Life Sciences Industry: Business as Usual?, 34 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
24–27 (2004) (analyzing the relationship between the FDA and drug companies).
325
House Hearings, supra note 292, at 29.
326
This fear is exactly the opposite of the ideal of informed consent. The FDA
appears to be functioning under a presumption that an incorrect and unsophisticated risk-benefit analysis would be done by the advisory panel, and by physicians
and parents, if given access to information it has not carefully edited. The doctrine
of informed consent encourages disclosure of the maximum amount of information
possible in a comprehensible format, and places great faith in the appropriateness of
the patient as the best decision maker.
327
See Laurel K. Leslie et al., The Food and Drug Administration’s Deliberations on Antidepressant Use in Pediatric Patients, 116 PEDIATRICS 195 (2005) (collected references
much of this criticism).
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Many feel that given its access to the bulk of this data over the last two
decades, it should have been far more aggressive in issuing warnings
and informing the medical and patient populations of the known
328
Recent congressional hearings and law review articles have
risks.
329
examined this issue in detail, and a thorough examination of the
propriety of the FDA’s role in the SSRI debacle is outside the scope of
this Article. What is clear is that the FDA is extremely cautious in
how it responds to negative trial results. To quote Dr. Robert Temple, director of the Office of Medical Policy at the FDA, “overall, 15
studies in pediatric [depression] do not support the effectiveness of
330
However, he then says that
these drugs in pediatric populations.”
to conclude based on these studies that the drugs do not work is
331
premature.
While it has not chosen to draw substantive conclusions from
this failure to show efficacy, the FDA has been critical of drug com332
pany claims of efficacy in these studies. An internal FDA email written by Dr. Mosholder about a study published in JAMA concerning
the efficacy of Zoloft in a pediatric population, where the trial results
328

Id.
See, e.g., Sarah D. Gordon, Note, Antidepressants and Teen Suicide: An Analysis of
the FDA’s Regulation of Pharmaceuticals for Use in Pediatric Patients, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 927
(2005) (writing from the perspective of pediatric medicine, Gordon is highly critical
of the FDA process as well as the handling of pediatric SSRI testing generally).
330
House Hearings, supra note 292, at 79 (statement of Robert Temple, FDA). This
number would include studies concerning Paxil and Zoloft that were published in
medical journals as positive studies, i.e., studies that stated they had proven efficacy,
but which failed to show efficacy under the FDA’s own analysis. Id.
331
The FDA asked the drug companies to perform these tests on a pediatric population under a system wherein the FDA can send a Written Request for a pediatric
trial, which then triggers an additional six-month exclusivity of the drug being tested.
Dr. Temple testified that because there was no requirement of a positive trial result
to trigger the six-month exclusivity extension, he believed the drug companies were
not properly motivated to design trials that would result in a positive finding. Id.; see
also Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408
(2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act reauthorized and expanded pediatric testing as initially
presented in the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997. See, e.g.,
Gregory Hazard, Please Sir, I Want Some More: Congress’ Carrot-and-Stick Approach to Pediatric Testing Leaves Therapeutic Orphans Needing More Protection, 20 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 467 (discussing these acts and pediatric drug testing regulation in
general). Most strikingly, Dr. Temple’s testimony seems to imply that the drug companies could design a study to generate a positive result if it was necessary for their
exclusivity. Given that a positive finding is supposed to be an objective measure of
effectiveness, this is an extraordinary notion, one that exposes how open to manipulation these trials might actually be and how acclimated to that manipulation the
FDA has become.
332
See House Hearings, supra note 292, at 166 (statement of Dr. Andrew Mosholder,
Medical Officer, FDA).
329
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had been previously submitted to the FDA and rejected as failing to
prove efficacy, shows this:
[W]e turned down this supplement[al application for drug approval] because each trial by itself failed. This article combines
the two trials to show a statistically significant effect. I don’t see
where they say the individual trials failed and they had to pool
them to have a result. Instead, the authors tout the combined
333
analysis for having a large sample size . . . talk about spin!

While the lack of public access to SSRI data was widespread, the
criticism of Zoloft described above involved a published study, one
that, however flawed, was presented to the public by being published
334
in a medical journal. Glaxo submitted at least nine studies of SSRIs
in a pediatric population to the FDA, and little of that data has ever
335
been published.
Dr. Graham Emslie was a researcher in four of
these nine studies and stated that he believed the results were not
published at least in part due to their negative results. Dr. Emslie
knew of at least six other trials for drugs similar to Paxil in a pediatric
population that had also been completed but not published; in an interview with the New York Times on this subject, Dr. Emslie would not
disclose the names of the companies or drugs due to his being a party
336
to confidentiality agreements regarding these studies.
Nondisclosure contracts between investigators and sponsors are
common, as are other clauses that can prevent investigators from independently examining the data they have helped collect or submit337
ting a manuscript for publication without sponsor approval. These
contracts are not limited to the SSRI example. The International
Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) recognized that these
limitations could severely impair the objectivity of the articles received by member journals and so in 2001 it began to require that au333

Id. This is further evidence of the problem being described here: the risk that
when one entity has control of data it can exert control over how it is perceived, and
is thus protected from challenges supported by other interpretations of the same information. Another example of this is Celebrex, a Cox-2 inhibitor. Data published in
the JAMA showed that it caused fewer side effects than two older arthritis drugs. The
results submitted turned out to be for the first six months of a twelve-month trial.
The twelve-month trial data showed no advantage of Celebrex over the other drugs
and the drug company had the full twelve months of data when it submitted the six
month results to the journal. ANGELL, supra note 2, at 109.
334
Karen D. Wagner et al., Efficacy of Sertraline in the Treatment of Children and Adolescents with Major Depressive Disorder: Two Randomized Controlled Trials, 290 JAMA 1033
(2003).
335
See House Hearings, supra note 292.
336
Harris, supra note 307.
337
Robert Steinbrook, Gag Clauses in Clinical-Trial Agreements, 352 N. ENG. J. MED.
216, 216 (2005).
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thors not be parties to these contracts, and not have the power to re338
view data, make publication decisions, or write their own articles.
These ICMJE requirements have simply not been complied with, as a
339
detailed study of these journals has revealed. The professional and
financial risks for researchers of failing to comply with the contracts
with drug companies are grave, and few universities have the resources to forego drug company funding. Drug companies have
been known to sue researchers for failing to comply with confidenti340
ality agreements, even with regard to safety concerns. A well-known
example of this involved Dr. Nancy Olivieri at the University of Toronto. Dr. Olivieri published an article expressing her concerns
about the safety of a drug she had tested for the drug company Apotex. Subsequently, she was sued by Apotex, lost her position at the
university, and ended up embroiled in a multi-year legal battle with
341
both of those institutions. The university eventually adopted one of
the stricter codes for limiting sponsor control of researchers.
Dr. Jane Garland was another researcher involved in many of the
studies of SSRIs for a pediatric population. She has written that she
too saw negative results of industry SSRI trials over the course of years
but was also prohibited from disclosing them due to nondisclosure
contracts she had with the sponsors. In her article on this subject she
describes in detail the numerous studies of these drugs that have

338

Id.
See Schulman et al., supra note 195.
340
There are examples of problems that motivated drug companies in the 1990s
to insist on these highly controlling contracts. See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Yoder,
950 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D. Ohio 1997). In Yoder, Dr. Yoder, a primary investigator for
drug trials concerning Accutane, an acne drug that has been shown to cause suicidality in children, was unsuccessfully sued by Hoffman-La Roche for selling his research
documents concerning Accutane under a theory that he had violated trade secret
protections of the drug company. Id. The failure of a theory of trade secret protection to protect company interests probably contributed to the development of
strongly-worded contract provisions protecting the sponsor’s interest in the data. Id.
In another incident, Immune Response, a drug company, sponsored a trial in a
number of academic centers. ANGELL, supra note 2, at 109–11. In 1996, the lead investigators said the results were negative, meaning the trial had failed to prove what it
set out to prove. Id. The drug company fought with the investigators over publishing the results, filing suit in an attempt to stop them, but the suit failed. Id. at 110.
Immune Response apparently wanted to alter the wording of the publication to show
a result in a small subset of the subjects in order to have a positive result to publish.
Id. The researchers said the result would not be scientifically valid. Id. The CEO of
Immune Response justified its attempt to alter the results for publication by saying,
“Just put yourself in my position. I spent over $30 million. I would think I have certain rights.” Id. at 111.
341
See Laura Bonetta, Olivieri to Testify Against Apotex in Europe, 7 NATURE MED. 644,
644 (2001).
339
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failed to show efficacy and have shown an increase in suicidality
342
Dr. Garland also discusses some statistics that illuminate anrisk.
other problem with SSRIs. According to recent statistics, twenty percent of children will suffer from an episode of major depressive dis343
Modern medicine has no readily
order before turning eighteen.
available treatment that has been widely accepted and proven effective for this illness. The placebo effect of SSRI therapy is very high,
meaning that forty to sixty percent of those given sugar pills show a
344
The SSRIs tend to have the
statistically significant improvement.
same percentages of effectiveness as placebos, though with the two345
fold increased risk of suicidality over the placebo incidence.
The
obvious answer to this would be for doctors to simply prescribe the
placebo, generating the statistical level of effectiveness with limited
risks of side effects. However, American physicians may not ethically
346
The finding that SSRIs do nothing better than
prescribe placebos.
placebos, when you have a high placebo response rate, means that
the SSRIs still perform better than doing nothing at all. Physicians
are left with two choices: (1) use the SSRI with serious risks of side effects in order to generate the effectiveness of the placebo; or (2) give
the patient nothing and forego the 40 to 60 percent chance of the
347
child finding relief. Given this quite real conundrum, the FDA may
have felt itself to be in a far more complex problem than was readily
apparent from the news coverage.
In 1991, Eli Lilly (“Lilly”), the manufacturer of Prozac, was confronted with concerns about the safety and efficacy of Prozac that
were very similar to the ones more recently raised about Paxil and
SSRIs in general. Lilly defended Prozac to an FDA panel and convinced this panel that Prozac did not cause an increased risk of sui342

See Garland, supra note 304, at 489–91; see also David Healy, Lines of Evidence on
the Risks of Suicide with Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors, 72 PSCHOTHERAPY &
PYSCHOSOMATICS 71, 77 (2003) (analyzing the studies of adult populations and drawing similar conclusions).
343
Garland, supra note 304, at 489.
344
Id.
345
Id.
346
For discussions of this complex question, see I. Klienman et al., Placebo Pain
Medication: Ethical & Practical Considerations, 3 ARCH. FAM. MED. 453 (1994), and M.B.
Kapp, Placebo Therapy and the Law: Prescribe with Care, 8 AM. J. LAW MED 371 (1982).
347
A letter to the editor of the American Journal of Psychiatry illustrates this dilemma, describing a shift from the “biopsychosocial” model to the “medical model of
disease and intervention,” leaving physicians less inclined to offer any treatment that
is not pharmaceutical. Thus, the letter concludes that if the pharmaceutical intervention is not efficacious, the psychiatrists are left saying, “Don’t take away the only
thing we have to offer these kids.” See Lawrence Diller, Letter, Antidepressants and
Children’s Depression, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1226 (2005).
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cidality or suicidal ideation in children and adolescents, which has
348
Participants of that panel have
now clearly been proven to occur.
since stated that were they given access to the data recently made
public, and at least some of which appears to have been known by
Lilly at the time of the panel’s deliberations, it is likely that they
349
would have voted against Prozac’s approval for use by children.
Glaxo was sued by the State of New York in June of 2004 for failing to release accurate data about children’s reactions to antidepres350
sants.
The complaint stated that Glaxo “engaged in repeated and
persistent fraud by misrepresenting, concealing and otherwise failing
to disclose to physicians information in its control concerning the
safety and effectiveness of its antidepressant medication . . . in treat351
ing children and adolescents with Major Depressive Disorder.” The
complaint further alleged that Glaxo allowed positive information
about pediatric use of SSRIs to be disclosed but withheld and con352
The complaint went into
cealed related negative information.
great detail about documents used by Glaxo as part of a deceptive
marketing campaign and about internal emails regarding negative
353
The disclosed documents do much to illuminate a culture
studies.
where data is merely one element among many of a business to be
managed, rather than something with independent scientific merit
that is judged solely by its accuracy. Glaxo quickly settled this law354
suit, but not before these internal documents were made public.
348

See Harris, supra note 307.
See id. It appears that Lilly suppressed data from the 1980s that showed a substantial risk of self-harm and violence to others in adults taking Prozac, failed to provide the data to the FDA, and did not provide it in response to discovery requests in a
subsequent lawsuit from 1989. See Jeanne Lenzer, FDA to Review “Missing” Drug Company Documents, 330 BRIT. J. MED 7, 7 (2005). Furthermore, Lilly had been given substantial post-marketing data from physicians reporting adverse events, but the drug
company edited the data before presenting it to the FDA, excluding seventy-six of
ninety-seven cases of reported suicidality among patients who had been prescribed
Prozac, according to an FDA memorandum dated September 11, 1990. Id.
350
See, e.g., Complaint at 1, People v. Glaxosmithkline (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 2,
2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/jun/jun2b_04_attach1.
pdf.
351
Id.
352
Id. at 2.
353
Id. passim.
354
Settlement was reached on August 26, 2004. See Press Release, Office of the
New York State Attorney General Andrew M. Cuomo, Leading Pharmaceutical Company Settles Suit Alleging Pricing Scheme for Cancer Patient Medications and other
Drugs: Settlements Will Yield Millions for Government Health Plans and Consumers
(Aug. 10, 2006), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/aug/aug10a_06.
html; see also Brooke A. Masters, Paxil Maker Will Post Its Unfavorable Test Results, WASH.
POST, Aug. 27, 2004, at E1.
349
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The crux of the internal documents showed that as early as 1998
Glaxo, recognizing that its sponsored studies on Paxil were generating problematic data about Paxil’s safety and efficacy in a pediatric
population, hoped to “manage the dissemination of data in order to
355
minimize any potential negative commercial impact.” According to
an internal document from Glaxo written for the purpose of managing the data from these trials, “[i]t would be commercially unacceptable to include a statement that efficacy had not been demonstrated”
356
According
even though efficacy had, in fact, not been established.
to the State of New York’s complaint, the management of these data
for this purpose appears to have extended to the content of practitioner letters and the promotional materials used by drug company
357
sales staff.
In response to the leaks to the press, the heightened concerns of
the public, congressional hearings and, likely, a multitude of other
reasons, the FDA eventually mandated that a black box warning be
358
placed on all SSRIs prescribed in this country. A black box warning
359
is the strongest type of warning that can be put on a label.
It con360
The SSRI
sists of bold letters surrounded by a thick black border.
warning says, in relevant part:
355

See Masters, supra note 354.
See Wayne Kondro & Barbara Sibbald, Drug Company Experts Advised Staff to
Withhold Data About SSRI Use in Children, 170 CAN. MED. ASS’N. J. 783, 783 (2004).
357
Practitioner letters are letters sent by drug companies to physicians that inform
them of information about the drugs they are prescribing. The promotional materials are ones handed to the doctors by the direct sales representatives of the drug
companies. A surprising amount of physician education about new treatments occurs through non-medical sales representatives of the drug companies. For a detailed discussion about the difficulty in separating pharmaceutical education from
promotion, see Carl Elliot, Pharma Goes to the Laundry: Public Relations and the Business
of Medical Education, 34 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 18, 18–23 (2004).
358
See FDA PROPOSED MEDICATION GUIDE: ABOUT USING ANTIDEPRESSANTS IN
CHILDREN OR TEENAGERS, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/antidepressants/SSRIMedi
cationGuide.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter FDA PROPOSED MEDICATION
GUIDE], for information regarding antidepressants in children and teenagers in October 2004. Interestingly, this guide, meant for parents and children, states that
“[t]here are Benefits and Risks When Using Antidepressants,” a statement about the
benefit of the drugs which is highly disputed. Id.
359
FDA Labeling Change Request Letter, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/anti
depressants/SSRILabelChange.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter FDA Labeling Change Letter]. In real numbers, if ten million children a year are prescribed
these drugs in this country, that means two hundred thousand of them will predictably suffer from suicidality with no counter-balancing proven usefulness of the drug
the children are taking. In addition, the studies have all been short-term, which
means that risks of long-term use, both physical side effects on children’s developing
bodies and future psychiatric problems, have not been studied.
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See FDA PROPOSED MEDICATION GUIDE, supra note 358.
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Pooled analyses of short-term (4 to 16 weeks) placebo-controlled
trials of nine antidepressant drugs (SSRIs and others) in children
and adolescents with MDD, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD),
or other psychiatric disorders (a total of 24 trials involving over
4400 patients) have revealed a greater risk of adverse events representing suicidal thinking or behavior (suicidality) during the
first few months of treatment in those receiving antidepressants.
The average risk of such events on drug was 4 percent, twice the
361
placebo risk of 2 percent. No suicides occurred in these trials.

What happened with children’s antidepressants has become a
quick way of referring to a complex set of problems. The main point
for purposes of this Article’s thesis is that drug companies do, in fact,
suppress and manipulate data that is derived from the use of human
research subjects. That which is learned, but not shared, from the
subject’s sacrifices can easily be used to mislead scientists, physicians
and the public, clouding rather than clarifying, which entirely confounds the purpose behind the sacrifice being made by the subject.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A disservice has been done to millions of people: the positive effects of their very real and measurable sacrifices as research subjects
have been unconscionably minimized. Congress’s initial legislative
goal leading to the development of the Belmont Report has been
substantially thwarted. Those who regulate these undertakings have
failed to instill the discipline necessary to ensure that their own regulatory requirements are fulfilled. Much of the research sponsored by
pharmaceutical companies that is conducted on human beings is
deeply flawed because it fails to satisfy a foundational element of
properly conducted research on human beings: it must be calculated
to generate a benefit for society. The failure to recognize the necessary legal implications of benefit to society in research has led to the
creation of regulatory inconsistencies and incoherencies on multiple
levels between the structure that regulates research on human sub362
jects and that which regulates the pharmaceutical industry as an
industry.
The pharmaceutical industry recognizes the financial value of
the information it collects from the use of human research subjects.
The desire to create financial incentives for the development of new
treatments and cures makes perfect sense, springing from our fear of
361

FDA Labeling Change Letter, supra note 359.
This structure is meant to include the Belmont Report and the Common Rule.
See Belmont Report, supra note 8.
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illness, our desire to save loved ones from pain and suffering, and a
belief that by offering an industry large profits it will be encouraged.
As stated in Part II, as much as we desperately fear illness, and
just as desperately as we need human subjects to experiment on in
our search for cures, we have no legal or normative right to use people in this manner. This use requires a difficult philosophical analysis
and justification. The normative challenge inherent in the project of
conducting research on human subjects is not susceptible to simple
or easy answers. The possibility of conflict with other societal desires
is unavoidable because of the very nature of the undertaking. In an
attempt to create a system for the use of human subjects that is normatively defensible, Congress directed the Commission to prepare
the Belmont Report, and this report has become law. If the principles in the Belmont Report have any meaning, the societal benefit
derived from the use of human research subjects has to be protected
far more vigorously than has been done in recent years. The fact that
this may have negative financial implications for the industry is not a
legal or philosophically valid ground for continuing to maintain the
status quo.
Pharmaceutical companies have routinely claimed that there
may be significant negative health implications for our population if
we fail to protect the financial incentives for drug companies that are
created by giving them full control over this type of data, due to a reduction in drug company research and development. Even if this is
entirely correct, it does not function as an excuse for failure to behave properly in this context. If possible, a rethinking of the incentive structure should be contemplated in order to protect the positive
effect of incentives while ending the negative implications for human
research subjects, but that is not a necessary corollary to the reform
that is called for here.
As was shown in Part II, the requirement of a benefit to society,
to humankind, from a specific research endeavor, is not subject to
balancing against a different good or benefit, including one that is
produced through the machinations of the pharmaceutical industry.
This type of balancing is inapplicable to the analysis that must take
place in assessing the potential benefit of an experiment. To put it
another way, potential research subjects reside in a room with one
locked door that leads into it. In order to open that door, the researcher must comply with the principles embodied in the Belmont
Report. Entering the room is a privilege, not a right, and the regulations are meant to protect the integrity of the undertaking, not to effectuate an efficient access to subjects. Viewed that way, the pharma-
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ceutical companies’ suppression and manipulation of the data they
control should function to prevent the industry from unlocking that
door.
There are a number of specific steps that can be taken as part of
reinvigorating the concept of benefit in research. HHS can propose
regulations that would enable IRBs to demand specific plans from researchers as to dissemination of data and analysis likely to be generated by the study under review. The FDA can publicly reexamine its
stance as regards protection of safety and efficacy data from FOIA requests, given the unintended consequence this has had of further isolating data that could, if released, promote a greater beneficial outcome from a research project. With the regulations that are currently
in effect, some change in enforcement is clearly necessary.
What this Article hopes to provoke with its analysis is an informed examination of our presumptions regarding the role of benefit in research on human subjects, with the different participants examining their current role and motivation in the scientific endeavors
they participate in. We have a model for this in the critical examination we gave to the principle of autonomy that occurred around the
time that the Belmont Report was being drafted, and which resulted
in a far more vigorous approach to informed consent in research and
in the private physician-patient relationship. That examination
caused enormous upheaval in many of the relationships that make up
the research enterprise. A similar shift is necessary for the concept of
benefit to have a meaning beyond platitude.

